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1.1 Introduction
The business cycle has persisted in the postwar period, producing
eight separate episodes ofsystematic fluctuations. Although a depres-
sion of the 1930s variety has been avoided, rnore severe and frequent
recessions have occurred in recent years, and the hope of cycleless
prosperity generated in the long expansion of the 1960s has been dis-
appointed by the record ofthe 1970s and early 1980s.
The experience of recent years has revived the scientific study of
the business cycle. In this paper the point of departure is an analysis
of historical events and processes, applying the ideas of the business
cycle literature to draw what generalizations can legitimately be made
about phenomena common to most or all cycles. First, the eight post-
war cycles are surveyed for their key elements. Second, a set ofbusi-
ness cycle phases are derived from this survey. Third, the types of
mechanisms that can trigger cycles are summarized. Fourth, particular
attention is paid to the financial side of th'e business cycle and its
systematic patterns since the mid-1950s. Fifth, we run a set of large-
Otto Eckstein was chairman of Data Resources, Incorporated and Paul M. Warburg
ProfessorofEconomics, Harvard University. Allen Sinai is chiefeconomist with Shear-
son Lehman Brothers, Incorporated, and adjunct professor of economics, Graduate
School of Business, New York University. He was at Data Resources from 1971 to
September, 1983.
We gratefully acknowledge the work ofRussell Robins, ofData Resources, Incorpo-
rated, and Shearson Lehman Brothers, and Peter Rathjens, ofShearson Lehman Broth-
ers, in performing the computer simulations and in relat€~d support. We are also grateful
to Robert Gross, of Data Resources, Incorporated, for his research assistance and to
Kathleen Chapman and Debra Jenkins for producing the manuscript. Robert E. Hall,
Robert J. Gordon, and Lawrence R. Klein made helpful suggestions on an earlier draft.
The discussants of this paper, Michael Lovell and Kenneth Singleton, made valuable
suggestions, and we thank Cary Leahey and Victor Zamowitz for their comments.
3940 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
scale econometric model simulations to estimate more precisely the
relative role of several possible business cycle mechanisms. Finally,
we draw some conclusions from our work on the main causes of cy-
clicality in the postwar period and the nature ofany changes that have
occurred. Throughout, the exposition focuses on the cycle both in real
activity and in financial conditions, emphasizing the interactions.
1.2 An Overview of the Eight Postwar Business Cycles
There appear to have been five distinct phases of business cycle
behavior in the postwar era: (1) from the end of World War II to the
outbreak ofthe Korean War; (2) from the Korean War to 1961; (3) from
1961 to 1969; (4) from 1969 to 1979; and (5) from 1979 to 1983. The
first phase was a period of adjustment from an economy in wartime
mobilization to peacetime normality. The second phase contained sev-
eral cycles and ended with considerable slack in the economy. In par-
ticular, three recessions occurred in the eight years from 1953 to 1961,
a by-product ofthe boom in the mid-1950s and concern over inflation
on the part ofthe Federal Reserve and the administration. From 1961
to 1969 there was a sustainedbusiness expansion, the longest in history,
though two extended pauses in growth occurred in 1962 and 1967.
Inflation rates were very low in the early 1960s, but in 1965 inflation
began to accelerate. Between 1966 and 1979 the economy was char-
acterized by a severe upward spiraling ofinflation, with wide fluctua-
tions in economic activity. In part these resulted from a series of de-
mand, supply, andpolicy shocks and a worldwideboom. Then, between
1979 and 1982, two deep downturns occurred, primarily as the result
of severely restrictive turns in monetary and fiscal policy to achieve
lower inflation.
1.2.1 Business Cycle Events and Mechanisms
Without attempting to provide a complete historical account of the
eight postwar business cycles, tables 1.1 and 1.2 highlight the events
particular to each episode and summarize the major dimensions. Table
1.1 stresses the clearly identifiable special features, thereby allowing
some common mechanisms to become visible as well. Table 1.2 pro-
vides the dimensions of length and amplitude for key parameters of
penormance in the postwar expansions and recessions.
The business cycle events can be classified into five types: (1) booms-
periods in which aggregate demand rises much more rapidly than a
balancedgrowthpathand/orpushesthe economycloseto its productive
ceiling; (2) negative demand shocks-sudden declines in aggregate de-
mand that are a primary cause ofcycle movements; (3) supply shocks-
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Fig. 1.1 Real GNP relative to trend: postwar period (billions of 1972
dollars). Shaded areas are NBI~R recessions.
to production; (4) price shocks-sudden exogenous movements in the
price level (such as the imposition and the lending of price controls);
and (5) creditcrunches-periodswhen financial distress produces shatp
discontinuities in flows of funds and spending and when the financial
strains include tight monetary policy, much lessened availability of
money and credit, sharp rises of interest rates, and deteriorating bal-
ance sheets for households, businesses, and financial institutions.
It can be seen that six of the recessions \vere preceded by booms.








































1950 1960 1970 1980
Fig. 1.2 Changing cyclicality ofreal GNP in the postwar period (per-
centage of trend). Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
and Vietnam, two involved stock-flow adjustments of consumer du-
rable goods, and one involved an unsustainable capital goods boom.
One boom was worldwide, following the collapse ofthe fixed exchange
rate regime in 1971. The most recent briefboom, in late 1978 and early
1979, was the result of excessively stimulative monetary and fiscal
policies, negative real interest rates, and a sharp, ifshort-lived, decline
of the dollar.
There were at least two exogenous negative demand shocks, both
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































046 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
an inevitable concomitant ofthe conversion ofthe American economy
from war to a peacetime footing. The swing in the federal budget was
so great that even though there was an early boom in civilian demand,
industrial production declined sharply and an "official" recession did
occur. The other shock of this type was President Eisenhower's
achievement of a balanced federal budget in 1960, when the largest
swing of the postwar period was registered in the full employment
budget.
At leastfour supply shocks can be identified as having played a major
contributing role in particular business cycles. The steel strike of 1959
was a major cause of the 1960 recession (and the auto strike of 1970
came close to aborting thatrecovery in its early stages). The two supply
disruptions ofworld oil, in 1973 and again in 1979-80, the agricultural
crisis created by the extraordinarily poor crops of1972, and the United
States-Russia wheat deal also had broad cyclical implications.
All but the first two of the recessions were preceded by credit
crunches. In each case interest rates shot up to high, usually unfamiliar
levels late in the upswing and began the process of diffusing reces-
sionary forces through the entire economy. In all but the most recent
two cases, the credit crunches also were characterized by sharply in-
creased credit rationing created by the presence ofinterest rate ceilings
that produced gross distortions in the flow of funds of the financial
system. And in every situation, balance sheets deteriorated to the point
where risks of bankruptcy and failure became costly. Sharp cutbacks
in spending and borrowing were the consequence.
As a result ofthese events and the underlying business cycle mech-
anisms, the economy experienced six recessions that can be safely
characterized as brief and mild, though they did not always feel that
way at the time. Three ofthe recessions were more serious: the 1957-
58, 1973-75, and 1981-82 episodes. The 1957-58 recession, which
followed a major boom and prolonged period of a worsening credit
crunch, was severe, with the unemployment rate rising from 4.1% to
7.4%. A worsening inflation, reaching 5.9% at the peak and largely
caused by "wage-push" and bottleneck excess demands, made the
Federal Reserve prolong its period of tightness and made the govern-
ment reluctant to aid the economy with fiscal stimulus. The recovery
from this recession was ratherweak and ultimately proved incomplete.
The othersevere recessions were longerand in eachcase represented
a complicated interaction of supply shocks that first triggered double-
digit inflation and then severe credit crunches. The recession of 1973-
75 was complicated by the collapse of price controls that had been
instituted in 1971-72 and by the synchronization ofthe business cycle
across the industrial world. The recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 were
worsened by the policy decision to accomplish a massive disinflation47 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
by maintaining a condition of severe credit restraint deep into the
recession.
This very brief survey ofbusiness cycle events makes clear that no
single, simple feature of the economy's behavior can be the cause of
the business cycle. Some ideas from the: recent literature, such as
asymmetric information, the misreading of absolute price changes as
relative price changes, the serial correlation introduced by buffer in-
ventory stocks in production, and lags in the wage/price process, may
be part of reality, but even the most cursory look at actual history
shows that they can be no more than a small part ofit.
1.2.2 Has the Business Cycle Changed in the Postwar Era?
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 and figure 1.2 indicate some changing character-
istics of the postwar business cycle, especially in recent years. First,
the cyclicality ofreal GNP has increased. R.eal GNP underwent swings
from 104% oftrend in 1953 tojustunder 94«% in 1958, from a little over
94% to 106% between the early 1960s and 1969, and then from over
106% in 1973 to under 92% in November 1982. Second, cyclical down-
turns have become more frequent and severe since 1969 (table 1.2, fig.
1.2). Three recessions have occurred in the: past ten years, and two of
them were the longest in the postwar period. Third, the business cycle
in general has become increasingly volatile in the postwar era. Swings
of industrial production, inflation, and the unemployment rate have
exceeded the average for the complete postwar period, both in expan-
sions and downturns, since the mid-1970s.
1.3 Stages of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Period
In a descriptive sense, there has beengeneral agreementon the stages
of the business cycle, as chronicled by th(~ National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. l These have been variously named the peak or upper
turning point, contraction or downturn, trough or lower turning point,
recovery, and expansion. The timing ofthese stages has been identified
on the basis of the systematic behavior of numerous statistical series
that primarily describe the real economic behavior ofthe United States
economy. These stages do no more than separate periods ofexpansion
from periods of contraction, however, and attach precise dates to the
turning points.
The actual events ofthe postwar business cycles, real and financial,
suggest a more elaborate set of "stages" in greater recognition ofthe
processes that are intrinsic to the fluctuations in economic activity. The
simultaneous and interrelated behavior of real and financial markets
1. See Burns and Mitchell 1946 and Mitchell 1927.48 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
produces real and financial sides to the business cycle that should be
described by the nomenclature.2
Thus, we propose the following stages: (1) recovery/expansion; (2)
boom; (3) precrunch period/credit crunch; (4) recession/decline; and
(5) reliquefication. This nomenclature recognizes and suggests that the
business cycle is more than just an occasional reversal of direction,
instead consisting of systematic real sector movements as well as as-
sociated financial phenomena.3 An occasional cycle may omit one or
another of the stages, and there will be some overlap in their timing.
But the typical cycle seems to run through all five stages. Table 1.3
shows the chronology of these five stages in the eight business cycle
episodes since 1950.
1.3.1 Recovery/Expansion
The lower turning point marks the beginning ofrecovery. The forces
of contraction having run their course, or improvements being made
in final demands, will cause an expansion to begin. Since the United
States enjoys continuous technological progress, positive capital ac-
cumulation, and a continued increase of the working-age population,
the normal condition for the economy is growth. No special theory,
therefore, is required to "explain" expansion; indeed, only significant
disruptive events can avoid it. Typically, however, certain catalytic
events have helped to initiate the expansion, most often changes in
policy that were designed to arrest and reverse the downturn.
In common usage, the recovery phase is usually defined to stretch
from the lower turning point to the time when aggregate measures of
physical activity such as real GNP or industrial production have re-
turned to their previous peak levels. Once the economy is on new
ground, recovery is said to be complete, though a more demanding set
of definitions would call for a return to prerecession unemployment
levels or a return to the neighborhood of the natural rate of operation
of the economy. The expansion phase continues from the end of re-
covery until the upper turning point is reached. In the business cycle
2. Most theories of the business cycle have paid little attention to the financial factor,
probably because of the difficulty of integrating "financial" with "real" theory. The
Keynesian tradition spawned a host of real theories (multiplier/accelerator) of business
fluctuations. Yet, clearly, events that are financial have played a major role in most
cycles.
3. The notion here is that each stage in the "real" business cycle is accompanied by
a stage in a "financial" or"flowoffunds" cycle. A flow offunds cycle has beendescribed
as having stages named the precrunch period, crunch, reliquefication, and accumulation
(Sinai 1978). The precrunchperiodoverlapswiththe expansion stageofstandardbusiness
cycle nomenclature. The crunch corresponds to the upper turning point. Reliquefication
occurs in recession and recovery. And the accumulation stage overlaps the expansion,
especially the early stage. Since the accumulation phase essentially is the expansion, it






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.50 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
timing of table 1.3, we accept the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search approach and the United States Bureau of the Census imple-
mentation of the definitions of this stage in each business cycle.
1.3.2 Boom
A boom is a period of an unsustainable rapid rate of advance of
economic activity, with the major sectors growing at rates that are
clearly temporary. In this stage the economy as a whole is often sig-
nificantly above its trend growth path and usually is near its ceiling of
potential output. There have been six booms since 1945, with five of
them soon succeeded by recessions and one (1964 to 1966) followed
by a growth recession. Only two of the recessions were not preceded
by booms, and both are easily explained by other circumstances. The
recession of 1960 was due to the negative demand shock ofa suddenly
balanced budget and credit crunch, with recovery kept incomplete by
restrictive demand managementpolicies. Therecession of1981-82was
part of a longer downturn that began in 1980. The brief expansion of
1980-81 can be viewed as little more than a short disruption of a
recession caused by a severely restrictive monetary policy, in a tem-
porary deviation from the basic goal ofdisinflation. Industrial produc-
tion only briefly surpassed its previous peak, but by enough for the
National Bureau of Economic Research to declare a business cycle
expansion.
The boom episodes are defined by the Data Resources, Incorporated
(DRI) composite boom index, a list of eight time series analogous to
the NBER leading indicator indexes but designed to identify the pres-
ence ofa boom rather than the imminence ofa downturn (fig. 1.3 and
table 1.4). This index was originally constructed because recessions
usually develop so quickly that even the best leading indicator indexes
barely give warning. If the boom could be identified instead, then ad-
vance notice with longer, though imprecisely known lead times should
become possible. The eight series are: (1) change in the ratio of con-
sumer credit outstanding to disposable income, (2) ratio ofcar sales to
driving-age population, (3) ratio of housing starts to population age
twenty years and older, (4) the DRI index of labor market tightness,
(5) eighteen-month growth in the real monetary base, (6) Federal Re-
serve Board capacity utilization rate for materials industries, (7) ratio
ofcapital spending to real trend line GNP, and (8) vendorperformance.
The eight series fall into two types. Items 1, 2, 3, and 7 are measures
of sectoral final demands that show disequilibrium from sustainable
trend values. Items 4, 6, and 8 measure the degree of resource utili-
zation, that is, the tightness ofmarkets. Item 5 measures deviations of
monetary policy from its sustainable trend: when the real monetary
base has grown too fast for eighteen months, a boom is likely to be
under way.51 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
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Fig. 1.3 The DRI composite boom index. Horizontal line denotes
boom average; shaded areas indicate boom periods.
1.3.3 Precrunch Period/Credit Crunch
Because every recession since the mid-1950s was preceded and trig-
geredbya creditcrunch, this experiencecanbe includedin the standard
stages of the business cycle. Late in the expansion, the demand for
credit expands beyond the ability ofbusinesses, households, and gov-
ernments to finance still expanding commitmlents out ofinternally gen-
erated funds. Accelerating inflation may also intensify the demand for
credit. At some point the supply ofcredit ceases to keep pace, usually
because the central bank becomes increasingly perturbed by visible























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.53 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
reserves and seeks to limit the money supply, interest rates rise sharply
and credit rationing becomes widespread. The period overwhich these
processes occur can be identified as the precrunch period, when the
preconditions of a financial crisis are laid.
More recently, with the deregulation of deposit and loan rates at
financial institutions and new deposit innovations, rising interest rates
have become the focus of adjustment through affordability and debt
service effects. Excessive monthly loan payments on big-ticket items
and onerous debt service charges relative to income orcash flows were
a principal mechanism of financial restraint in 1980 and 1981-82, al-
though some traditional credit strains also occurred.
In the credit crunch itself, households, businesses, and financial
institutions find that the expectations upon which spending plans are
based become falsified as balance sheets deteriorate, with loan re-
payments, debt burdens, and costs of financing all becoming surpris-
ingly burdensome. Interest rates move sharply higher, rising in non-
linear fashion from a combination of strong private sector credit
demands, reduced liquidity in the commercial banking system, sales
of financial assets to raise funds or prevent large capital losses, and
a monetary squeeze by the Federal Reserve. As rising interest rates,
credit rationing, and the financial risk associated with deteriorated
balance sheets reduce the total level of spending, market activities
grow less than expected, curtailing internal cash flows and adding
further to the needs for external financing. ]Households reduce outlays
and become extremely cautious. Firms Ctease to hire new workers
and attempt to reduce inventories. Business plant and equipment
outlays are sharply cut. As a new perception of the state of the
economy spreads, business demand for the factors of production
shrinks. Changes in inventory policy amplify the production cutbacks
of the more basic industries.
The crunch is at the heart ofthe business cycle mechanism, partic-
ularly the upper turning point, and is discussed more fully in section
1.5. The timing of both the precrunch period and crunches since the
mid-1950s is shown in table 1.3.
1.3.4 Contraction/Recession
According to the NBER methodology, a recession covers the period
beginning with the upper turning point and continuing through the
intervalofabsolute decline in physical activity. Once the decline begins,
business has to adjust its inventories to the lower current volume of
sales and curtail its total spending commitments to reflect the reduced
availability of internal capital. Depending on the extent of revision of
business expectations between the months before the upper turning
point and the period ofrecession, the adjustJment will be large or small.54 Otto EcksteinlAllen Sinai
The severity of the financial disturbance associated with the credit
crunch and the speed with which fiscal and monetary policies switch
from restraint to stimulus also affects the length and severity of the
recession.
The lower turning point is reached when business spending com-
mitments have moved closer to the new, lower equilibrium and stock
adjustment processes set up for a reversal. Exogenous forces, such as
stimulative changes in monetary and fiscal policy, also can accelerate
or delay the lower turning point.
1.3.5 Reliquefication
Reliquefication is a stage offinancial restructuring that occurs during
recession and early recovery. During the period leading up to a crunch,
business and household balance sheets become more and more strained,
remaining troublesome through the crunch itselfand even in the early
stages of recession. Financial commitments can be reduced only so
fast, and sources offunds usually shrink even more quickly when the
economy turns down. Business adjusts to this situation by an "under-
shoot" on spending commitments, including hiring freezes or even
layoffs, drastic deferrals on capital budgets, and a dumping of inven-
tories through sales at distress prices, all in order to quickly improve
cash flow and strengthen balance sheets. A rebuilding ofbalance sheets
through the accumulation of financial assets, other than transactions
money, and a decumulation of liabilities then takes place to help set
the stage for further expansion.
The process ofreliquefication has taken anywhere from two to six-
teen quarters, according to table 1.5. Until a minimum degree of re-
liquefication is accomplished, a business cycle upturn is difficult to
achieve or sustain.
1.4 The Generic Cyclical Mechanisms
The analytical minimum requirements of a macro model capable of
producing cycles have long been understood.4 The cycles can originate
in a two-period, second-orderlineardifference equationmodel in which
the parameters on the endogenous variables are of sufficiently desta-
bilizing magnitudes. Ifthe coefficients are very large and destabilizing,
the economy takes on an explosive character. If the coefficients are
smaller, the cycles are quickly damped. Interveningvalues will generate
a self-sustaining cycle in linear systems, without random shocks.
4. For an exposition of this business cycle mechanism, see Samuelson 1939, and
Baumol 1959.SS The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
A model with intrinsically damped properties can generate cycles if
it is combined with a shock mechanism that reinforces the cyclical
movements. Such shocks can be systemati,;, with their own period-
icity-for example, a cyclicality in fiscal or monetary policy that is
created by politics or lagged responses to business conditions in the
private sector. Or the shocks can appear to be random in nature-
occasional strikes, droughts, oreven events such as the OPEC oil price
hikes.
The business cycle literature has proposed many mechanisms that
stem from the analytics of the basic dynamic second-order linear
difference equation. The multiplier/accelerator model is the best known,
with its linear consumption function and an investment equation based
on the rate of change of output one quarter earlier. Hicks (1950)
concluded that the accelerator coefficient in such a system was suf-
ficiently large to make the cycle intrinsically explosive. A ceiling and
a floor therefore were used to contain the economy to a stable cyclical
path.
The accelerator model, or its more flexibl~~ variant the capital stock
adjustment model, has been applied to various components of final
demands. The stockofbusiness fixed capital is the archetypal example,
of course. Adjustment of the inventory stoc;k to expected sales was
proposed by Metzler (1941). Consumer durable goods purchases can
be governed by a stock adjustment mechanism, with changes in per-
manent income producing changes in the dc~sired stock of consumer
durables.
Financial behavior also contains a large ele~ment ofstock adjustment
mechanisms. Individuals and businesses de:sire certain portfolios of
assets and liabilities. Ifthere are changes in the target stocks, the flows
necessary to accomplish the desired stock adjustments can be highly
volatile and cyclical.
The dynamics ofadjustments in wages and prices can reinforce the
cyclical mechanisms, or provide an impetus of their own, so long as
they are not of the market clearing type. If it takes a considerable
intervalfor wages tofully adjusttochanges in the inflation rate, whether
for reasons ofcontracts or gradual learning processes, cyclical mech-
anisms may be reinforced because the inflationary effects of a strong
expansion will not be fully felt for some tinle. Consequently, the re-
action ofpolicy orofconsumers may coincide in timing with the down-
turn in the real cycle.
The dynamics of the production process accentuate cycles.5 Pro-
ducers often misperceive the strength offinal demand because they are
removed by several stages of production from end markets; they find
5. See Zarnowitz 1973.56 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
it difficult to distinguish inventory changes at intermediate stages of
production from swings in final demands. Optimal buying policy re-
sponds to actual delivery periods and short-term price behavior, and
these buying policies in turn lengthen orderbooks, thereby intensifying
supply shortages, triggeringfurther inventorybuying, and raisingprices
offactors and intermediate goods.
The business cycle mechanism also can be reinforced by external
developments. Whereas foreign markets and foreign sources ofsupply
usually serve as stabilizers of the business cycle, the international
monetary system and changes in such factors as world oil prices can
help create a synchronization ofcycles in real demands that intensify
the instability ofmaterial and product markets ofinternationally traded
goods.
Expectations have long been recognized as a source of potential
instability and fluctuations in economic activity (see appendix 1.2).
Keynes stressed the importance of expectations as a source of insta-
bility in the investment andliquidity preferencefunctions. Autonomous
shifts in investment demand and in the demand for money provided
impulses for cyclical movements, affecting the amplitudes of expan-
sions and declines. The consumption function also was subject to au-
tonomous shifts.
Subsequently, there was a general acceptance of expectations phe-
nomena as a determinant ofeconomic behavior. Stock adjustment and
adaptive expectations models became widespread, though character-
ized by a backward look at actual behavior. In Hicks (1950), distributed
lags in the adjustment of consumption and investment contributed to
the dynamics of the trade cycle that was analyzed. In more recent
years, surveys of expectations and notions of rationally formed ex-
pectations have replaced extrapolative or adaptive expectations in much
of theory, as a more forward looking means of incorporating expec-
tations into the analysis of economic behavior.
As a generic mechanism, expectations can affect the business cycle
in several ways. First, the mannerbywhich expectedvalues areformed
can have an impact-in particular on business cycle dynamics through
the lags involved in expectations formation. Second, deviations ofac-
tual from expectedbehaviorin the form ofsurprises ordisappointments
affect economic and financial market behavior. Third, expectations of
movements toward equilibrium are based on notions that derive from
theoretical constructs or practical knowledge of processes and affect
behavior. Finally, waves of optimism or pessimism influence both the
amplitude and the time lags ofeconomic activities.
Expectations are formed rationally, through adaptive behavior or
learningfrom pasterrors orby extrapolationofpastbehavior. Financial
markets generally come closest to exhibiting rationally formed expec-57 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
tations. There is an early discounting of potential future events and,
in particular, expectations on policy. Information is used efficiently,
and decisions are made quickly. One exception is in the formation of
expected inflation, where a slow process ofadjustment seems to char-
acterize the reactions offixed income investors to changes in the actual
rate ofinflation.
Othermarkets, whetherfor reasons ofadjustment lags, slow changes
in perceptions, delivery lags, contractual time lags, surprises, or un-
expected shocks, exhibit extrapolative or adaptive expectations. The
labor market is characterized by slower reactions in expectations through
instances of money illusion and considerable extrapolative behavior
based on past inflation. Cost-of-living agrf~ements, for example, per-
petuate past changes ofinflation into wages, which in turn affect future
inflation through unit labor costs.
Finally, the element of surprise or disappointment can be important
for the business cycle. When the sales expectations of business are
disappointed on more than a random basis., capital outlays and inven-
tories are cut back, imparting cyclicality to the economy. Tighter than
expected Federal Reserve policy can bring worse than expected debt
service charges and unexpected reductions in spending and borrowing.
The quantification ofexpectations in models ofthe United States econ-
omy remains fairly primitive but still contributes to explaining cyclical
behavior.6
The list ofgeneric business cycle mechanisms can be extended and
presentedin a moreelaborateclassification(table 1.5). Therearefactors
that principally affect the amplitude ofthe business cycle: the impulse
mechanisms. Impulses can stem from autonomous shifts in exogenous
variables having to do with stabilization policy, wars, strikes, new
institutionalarrangements, financial deregulation, andtechnologicalad-
vances. "Endogenous" contributions to the amplitude ofthe business
cycle include shifts in sentiment, swings ofinflation and interest rates,
and deviations ofactual eventsfrom expectations, among others. These
factors have seemed to affect the amplitude of the business cycle but
themselves occur in response to other inputs.
Propagation mechanisms affect the oscillations, phase, and duration
characteristics ofthe business cycle. The internal diffusion ofbusiness
cycle responses often occurs through the signal mechanisms (prices,
wages, interest rates, etc.) ofthe economic system and distributed lag
reactions to them. Adjustmentlags, in bothreal andfinancial processes,
propagate various impulses through the system. Stock adjustments and
expectations formation are major generic propagation mechanisms, oc-
6. See Eckstein 1983, 40-49, and Brimmer and Si.nai 1981 for a discussion of how
expectations influence the economy in the DRI model.S8 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai



















































Policy responses to the economy,
inflation, unemployment, and
monetary growth
Note: Many ofthe mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, overlapping between
providing an impulse to the system and acting as a propagation mechanism.
curring in durable goods spending by households and business, inven-
tory accumulation, debt and financial asset accumulation, and deriv-
ative factors such as debt service relative to cash flow, loan repayment
burdens, and even cataclysmic disturbances like bankruptcies or de-
fault. Finally, certain elements ofpolicy enter into the propagation of
impulses, for example, the response of monetary policy to changes in
inflation engendered by the quadrupling ofcrude oil prices in October
1973. Though the endogenous response of policy may operate only
withlonglags, itmustberegardedas anessentialpartofthepropagation
mechanism.
The postwarperiod has seen instances when eachofthe mechanisms
in table 1.5 played a role. How important have these mechanisms been,
on average? Which ofthem are really central to the persistence ofthe
business cycle? And, have they changed over the postwar era? In
section 1.6 below, the results of some simulations with the large-scale59 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
DRI econometric model of the United States economy provide some
perspective on these questions. But since Inany ofthe mechanisms of
the business cycle are financial, we presenta more detailedexamination
ofthe role for money and finance in the business cycle before turning
to these results.
1.5 The Financial Factor in the Postwar Business Cycle
In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, formal theories ofthe business cycle
typically paid scant attention to the role ofmoney, credit, and interest
rates, concentrating instead on "real" explanations, principally mul-
tiplier/accelerator interactions.7 The availability offinance was recog-
nized as a constraint and critical ingredient in the upper turning point.
Interest rates were thought to have only a minorrole, operating through
the costoffinance and with inelastic response coefficients for spending.
These limited views did not capture the essence of how financial
factors condition the pattern of business :fluctuations, however. Vir-
tually every major recession or depression has contained financial events
as critical ingredients.8 And expansions and booms have been affected
by the financial factor as well-in particular through a high elasticity
of supply.
In the postwar era a newer phenomenon, although having many
characteristics similar to other episodes throughout history, has emerged
as a systematic element in the business cycle. This is the credit crunch
experience.9 The financial events of the clunch and interactions with
housing activity, consumer spending, business outlays, and state and
local government spending have served as both impulse and propa-
gation mechanisms. Periods of major financial disturbances are gen-
erally agreed to have occurred in the form ofcredit crunches in 1966,
1970, 1974, 1980, and 1982. 10 Less obvious has been the expansiveness
ofthe financial system during the early stages ofbusiness expansions.
All of this suggests a financial side to the business cycle, just as sys-
tematic in its effects as real phenomena but not widely analyzed.
The financial side offluctuations in business activity can be termed
a "flow of funds" or "credit" cycle.II The notion of a flow of funds
7. HaberIer 1937 provides a discussion of the place of the monetary factor in the
overinvestment theories of the business cycle.
8. See the various discussions in Hawtrey 1926, Fisher 1933, Haberler 1936, Hicks
1950, Minsky 1977, and Sinai 1976, who highlight the "financialfactor" as a key element
in the mechanism ofthe business cycle.
9. Credit crunches orfinancial crises have been discussed and analyzed in Fisher 1933,
Minsky 1977, Sinai 1976, 1978, 1980, and Wojnilower 1980. To Fisher, Minsky, and Sinai
the process is endogenous, a by-product of the real c:ycle that simultaneously occurs.
10. The Great Depression also has been viewed as arising from financial processes.
See Friedman and Schwartz 1963 and Bernanke 1981.
11. Sinai 1976, 1978, 1980; Eckstein 1983, chap. 4.60 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
cycle is based on the fully simultaneous nature of "real" and "finan-
cial" activities and the feedback effects on spending ofbalance sheet
positions and the liquidity of various sectors as the business cycle
evolves.
Changes in spending and employment are accompanied by financial
activities such as borrowing or debt repayment and sales or pur-
chases of financial assets that affect interest rates, balance sheets,
and liquidity. This in turn brings fluctuations in spending through
both flow and stock adjustment effects. Since every expenditure or
use of funds must be financed by a source of funds, systematic pat-
terns of financial behavior accompany the real outlays for house-
holds, businesses, and government.t2 Financial institutions such as
banks and thrifts show analogous patterns of behavior, except they
use funds to make loans and investments and obtain funds from de-
posits and loan repayments. In addition to the flows ofmoney, credit,
and assets that accompany real side activities, flow-stock cumula-
tions and decumulations of debts and assets occur, altering the state
of sectoral balance sheets.
Along with interest rates and cash flows, the balance sheets deter-
mine the financial risk associated with each sector. At the crunch
stage ofthe business cycle, the degree offinancial risk that is present
constrains sectoral spending, limits the availability of credit, can re-
sult in bankruptcies, default, and failures, and intensifies the down-
turn in the economy. Monetary policy and interest rates play an im-
portant role in this process, setting limits on the availability offunds,
affecting debt service burdens, and acting as determinants offinancial
risk.
Most prominent in the flow offunds cycle is the crunch, which has
appeared late in expansion to help bring about a turning point and to
intensify the ensuing downturn. Less well documented and not so ob-
vious has been the processes ofrepair and rebuilding ofbalance sheets
and liquidity that have systematically occurred in recovery and expan-
sion, along with the real side characteristics of the business cycle.
These, in fact, have been every bit as systematic as the financial crisis
or crunches. This stage is called reliquefication.
12. In a flow offunds cycle, uses offunds include acquisitions offinancial or physical
assets. Sources of funds comprise the borrowing necessary to finance acquisitions of
physical assets and the "new money" flows that become available to each sector period
by period. These new money flows are current sources of funds such as disposable
income (households): cash flow (corporations); deposit inflows, adjusted for reserve
requirements, and loan repayments (financial institutions); and tax receipts (federal,
state, and local governments). The new money flows can be used for spending on goods
and services, accumulating financial assets, or reducing outstanding liabilities. When
they are insufficient to at least cover the uses offunds, external financing is necessary.
The balance sheet and liquidity positions ofdifferent sectors ofthe economy change and
evolve during the flow offunds cycle as well, providingyetanother sourceoffluctuations
in the business cycle.61 The Mechanisms ofthe Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
1.5.1 The Flow of Funds Cycle
The "flow of funds" or "credit cycle" can be divided into phases
of accumulation, developing financial instability or the precrunch pe-
riod, crunch, and reliquefication. 13
In the accumulation stage, there is an upturn in the acquisitions of
physical and financial assets corresponding to the expansion phase of
the business cycle. Financial constraints ar,e minimal, and previously
restored liquidity is dissipated only slowly. Funds are available, af-
fordability is not a majorlimiting factor, and the institutions that supply
finance are eager to make funds available. A boom often develops
during the accumulation phase and is an iInportant ingredient in the
crunch process thatfollows. New money flo~ws rise most rapidly during
accumulation, helping to keep sectoral external financing requirements
to a minimum.
The precrunch period is characterized by an intensifying squeeze on
liquidity where the credit demands ofhouseholds, businesses, and gov-
ernment progressively outstrip the ability of the financial system to
provide sufficient funding at affordable intenest rates. Both internal and
external sources offinance slowly, but continuously, diminish for each
sector or become available only at high costs. New money flows be-
come insufficient to finance the planned uses of funds and to cover
rising debtburdens. Duringthis stage, risinginterestrates andincreased
debt worsen the balance sheets of the private sector, although not
sufficiently to fully discourage spending.
The ensuing liquidity squeeze takes effect sector by sector until the
uses offunds are curtailed, whetherfor expenditures on physical assets
(households, business, and government), for hiring oflabor (business
and government), for the production of loans (financial institutions),
or for the accumulation of financial assets (households, business, fi-
nancial institutions). A sustained and increasingly tighter monetary
policy also is an important characteristic ofthe precrunch period. Free
reserves become highly negative, interest rates begin to rise sharply,
and monetary growth eventually shows a decided slowing.
The crunch is the financial crisis that culnlinates a precrunch period.
A crunch may be defined as a credit crisis stemming from the collision
ofan expandingeconomy with a financial systemthat has beendepleted
of liquidity. The crunch is characterized by extremely depressed li-
13. Sinai 1978. The accumulation stage corresponds to the expansion phase of the
traditional business cycle. The precrunch period occurs in late expansion and boom.
The crunch overlaps with the upper turning point or peak, and very early stages of a
downturn. Reliquefication is at the same time as the downturn and early recovery. In
recent years there has been more of an "open" side to the flow of funds cycle as the
effects of United States financial phenomena spread to the rest of the world through
flexible exchange rates and policy reactions to protec:t domestic currencies, with sub-
sequent feedback effects on the United States econ001Y.62 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
quidity and deteriorated balance sheet positions for households, cor-
porations, and financial institutions; sharply increased interest rates as
all sectors scramble for remaining available funds; rising yield differ-
entials as investors sell risky investments and switch to safe assets; a
severely depressed stock market; and the inability ofmany borrowers
to obtain funds at any cost. Increased failures ofbusiness and financial
institutions are part of the picture, though only occasionally excep-
tionally severe. Rising delinquencies on loans and defaults also char-
acterize the process. The crunch or crisis itselfoccurs as these factors
reach a breaking point and are often accompanied by some cataclysmic
financial event such as the bankruptcy of a major company or the
surprising failure of a financial institution. With one exception during
the Vietnam War, the outcome ofeach crunch has been a recession or
pause in economic growth near or at the end ofthe episode.
No single factor has ever been solely responsible for the onset ofa
full-blown credit crunch. It has been caused by the prolonged presence
of (1) the pressure from a strongly expanding real economy and the
demand for funds, often a boom; (2) the shortage of lendable funds
stemming from reduced savings flows, weak deposit inflows, dimin-
ished cash flows, and tighter bank reserves; and (3) a restrictive mon-
etary policy.
The financial factor has affected the length, depth, amplitude, and
intensity ofthe cyclical process. Indeed, along with evidence from the
1930s, the postwar experience suggests that the financial factor is a
critical ingredient in the business cycle. Since, over time, monetary
policyreactions are endogenous to theeconomy, theirrole as anintegral
part ofthe business cycle mechanism should be expected. But it is not
just monetary policy that influences the business cycle process; the
feedback effects from borrowing, lending, flow-stock processes in fi-
nance, balance sheets, changes in liquidity, and financial risk affect
cyclical behavior as well.
1.5.2 The Crunch
The most salient financial events in the postwar business cycle have
been the crunch and its aftermath, reliquefication. Four ingredients
have typically characterized the credit crunch episodes: boom, infla-
tion, tight money and disintermediation, and financial instability.14
Sharply rising interest rates and depressed asset prices also have been
characteristic. These factors have varied in their intensity and changed
over the years with new legislation, evolving institutions, and changes
in the practice ofmonetary policy.
14. Sinai 1978, 9-10.63 The Mechanisms ofthe Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
Boom
The boom has been described (section 1.3.2) as a major stage in the
generalized business cycle. Its role in the financial or flow of funds
cycle is to drain liquidity from households and business as new money
flows become inadequate to support a strong pace of spending and as
financial assets are sold to provide funds. In the boom, savings rates
decline and business cash flow diminishes relative to capital outlays.
Loan demands rise sharply, first by consumers and then by business.
The rising loan demands and declining savings flows squeeze banks
and financial intermediaries into tight liquidity situations. The boom
has usually preceded a precrunch period but also has overlapped the
early stages of the crunch process (table 1.3).
Inflation
High and accelerating rates of inflation tend to intensify the crunch
process. Household disposable income may not keep pace with the
rising prices ofgoods and services, and the personal savings rate may
fall. During an initial burst ofinflation, the: cash flow ofbusiness may
actually be enhanced, but as rising inflation becomes increasingly cost
based, nominal spendingon plant, equipment, andinventories outpaces
internally generated funds, and firms must borrow heavily. Inflation
also erodes the value ofoutstanding financial assets, reducing the pro-
ceeds from any liquidation. Because of inflation, a greater volume of
external financing is necessary to fill the gap between spending and
internally available funds, both for households and for business. Bor-
rowing requirements increase for these sectors, and deposit inflows to
financial institutions are reduced as a result. The lessened new savings
flows to financial institutions, in turn, restrict the availability of mort-
gage money, adding upward pressure to interest rates, limiting afford-
ability, and restraining housing. Inflation may also raise the financing
requirements ofthe government sector, since the rising costs ofgoods
and services and higher interest rates may exceed tax receipts from
higher prices. Finally, rising inflation increases long-term interest rates,
through premiums related to expectations., The result is considerably
increased pressure on the financial markets.
Tight Money and Disintermediation
Tight money and disintermediation have been essential ingredients
of every credit crunch. A severely restrictive monetary policy has
limited the reserves of the banking systenl and caused short-term in-
terest rates to rise sharply. The commercial banking system has trans-
mitted the changes in the policy related federal funds and treasury bill
rates to other money market rates. Before 1980, as these rates moved.()4 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
above the ceiling-constrained returns on deposits atbanks and nonbank
financial intermediaries, disintermediation became prevalent. Depleted
bank liquidity from weakened inflows of deposits, and tight reserve
positions caused banks to seekfunds aggressively by issuing large CDs
and Eurodollars and by borrowing at the Federal Reserve, bidding
money market interestrates higher. Pressure exertedthrough increased
borrowing at banks and issues of commercial paper also added to the
upward thrust of interest rates. In these circumstances short-term in-
terestrates rose atanacceleratingrate, accompaniedbycreditrationing
to channel bank lending to the more profitable commercial and indus-
trial loan area.
With sharply rising interest rates, stock market declines occurred
and the confidence of households and business weakened. The higher
interest rates and lower stock prices increased borrowing costs to cor-
porations and households and made existing debt service burdens more
onerous. Savings and cash flows diminished further, extending the pe-
riod of disintermediation and greatly reducing the supply of mortgage
money. Typically an ongoing tight monetary policy intensified these
effects. With some lags, significant effects on the real final demands
ofthe economy have eventually caused sharp reductions in aggregate
demand, production, and employment.
In the most recent episodes of 1980:2 and 1981:1 to 1981:4, a new
approach to monetary policy instituted in October 1979 permitted in-
terest rates to reach unprecedented levels. With the lifting of ceilings
on deposit and loan rates in 1980, the disintermediation offunds from
financial intermediaries was delayed, and extraordinarily high interest
rates were required to price out most homebuyers. The tight money
and disintermediation factor worked more through interest rates and
debt burdens in recent years than previously.
Thedurationofmonetary tightness has always beena criticalelement
in the crunch process. In virtually every precrunch period, the Federal
Reserve overstayed a restrictive monetary policy for longer than was
necessary. Similarly, periods of reliquefication often have been char-
acterized by a prolonged period of excessively stimulative monetary
policy.
Financial Instability
Financialinstability refers to progressively weakening balance sheets
and the development ofmore risky financial positions for households,
business, financial institutions, and government during a credit crunch
period. Deteriorating liquidity and weakened balance sheets arise from
endogenous developments in the economy or from external shocks.
The endogenous developments include a spending boom on the part
ofhouseholds and business, which causes loan demand and debt bur-
dens to become excessive. External shocks, such as the commodity6S The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
and oil price shock inflation of 1973-74, can lead to large needs for
finance in every sector ofthe economy. The financial instability takes
the form ofa shortage in liquidity, overwhelming debt service or debt
repayment burdens, or an undesired liability structure. The develop-
ment of exceptionally risky financial positions for each sector in the
economy has characterized every crunch. Indeed, an increased fre-
quency ofbankruptcies, defaults, and failures has been induced by this
process, sometimes leading to further apparently "autonomous" re-
ductions in spending.
Reliquefication
The stage during which sectoral balance sheet strength and liquidity
are restored is called reliquefication. In setting a base for future ex-
pansion, the process ofreliquefication plays a key role in the financial
cycle. The outlays of the household and corporate sectors are drasti-
cally reduced. Borrowing proceeds more slowly, outstanding liabilities
are reduced, and the demand for financial assets rises sharply. New
money flows are well in excess of the de.pressed outlays, providing
ample funds to "reliquefy." Financial institutions benefit from the in-
creased savings and cash flows ofthe private sector, through substan-
tially higher deposit inflows. The financial institutions repay debts and
accumulate financial assets in the face ofweak loan demand. Monetary
policy eases during this stage as the central bank strives to stimulate
the economy. The reserves position ofthe banking system is enhanced,
and interest rates decline or stay low.
During reliquefication, federal budget deficits and treasury financing
are high but do little harm. The large deficits principally arise from the
reduced tax receipts and higher government outlays ofrecession, cor-
responding to lower spending and increased financial saving by house-
holds and businesses. In a period of rebuilding balance sheets, the
increased savings flows are used to strengthen the asset side ofbalance
sheets-in particular through purchasing large amounts ofthe treasury
financing associated with the deficits. The flows of funds from com-
mercial banks and nonbank thrift institutions are directed toward ab-
sorbing a large volume of treasury securities. The Federal Reserve,
before October 1979, also absorbed much ofthe treasury debt, as part
of its monetary easing. And often the rest of the world sector has
purchased a considerable volume oftreasury securities. Interest rates
stay low longer because ofthe phenomenon ofreliquefication, with its
strongly rising demands for high-quality assets to reduce the financial
risk that has arisen during the crunch.
In the most recent episode of 1979 to 1982, the crunch process was
somewhat different. This is because ofthe change in approach to mon-
etary policy by the Federal Reserve in October 1979. Increases in the
demand for money, whether from strong sectoral spending, shock in-66 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
flation, or some interaction ofboth, put increasing pressure on interest
rates with no attempt by the central bank to restrain the rises. Flows
of funds were sustained through the deregulation of deposit and loan
rate ceilings and new depository instruments, so that funds availability
was less affected. Because scarce credit was almost entirely allocated
through higher interest rates, affordability and debt service burdens
played a greaterrole in the crunchprocess, eventually bringing a down-
turn just as in prior episodes.
The role of monetary policy in reliquefication has been the reverse
ofthat in the crunch process, generally following a stimulative posture
to aid the rebuilding of sector balance sheets.
1.5.3 Measures of Sectoral Financial Behavior in the Flow of
Funds Cycle
Figures 1.4 to 1.10 show several summary measures that reflect the
systematic behavior in the liquidity and balance sheet positions of
households, businesses, and depository institutions. The precrunch
period/crunch episodes are shaded in each. The clear areas represent
the reliquefication and accumulation phases. The various measures
show similar patterns of behavior across most flow of funds cycles,
reflecting the stages of the financial cycle. The various balance sheet
ratios also serve as an indicator of the financial strain that eventually
induces restrained spending and borrowing in risk averse sectors.
For households, the mortgage loan repayment burden relative to
disposable income and the ratio offinancial assets to liabilities indicate
strain or ease in the balance sheet. The higher the proportion of loan
repayments to income, the less spending and borrowing will take place.
Thegreaterthe quick ratio, the more roomexistsfor new commitments.
Othermeasures, such as wealth and net worth orthe growth in financial
assets, reflect the state of household liquidity.
For business, the "quick" ratio, proportion of debt service to cash
flow, the ratio of short to total outstanding liabilities, and leverage are
indicators ofbalance sheet strengthand liquidity. These measures show
the greatest deterioration near or in the crunch.
Forfinancial institutions, loan-to-deposit ratios aptly characterizethe
state ofliquidity. When high, depository institutions aggressively seek
funds in the open market, pushing interest rates up sharply. The capital
position ofdepository institutions also generally weakens at these times.
1.6 Sources of the Business Cycle: Some Simulation Results
The empirical significance of the various potential sources of the
cycle has not been studied much, and doing so is an elaborate and67 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
difficult undertaking. Yet ifthe business cycle is to be a serious subject
of scientific study, such investigation must be performed.
The following simulations represent so:me initial research in that
direction. The DRI model ofthe United States economy has been used
in a series of counterfactual simulation exercises designed to identify
and quantify the impact of some causes of the business cycle. The
results are model-specific and thus must be viewed cautiously. Further,
econometric model simulations provide only approximations, with each
simulation one of a possible large distribution of outcomes.
However, though the model is inevitably imperfect, it is an elaborate
representation ofthe United States econonlY. Since it is built on quar-
terly data and heavily used for short-term forecasting, the successful
representation of the economy's short-run dynamics was high on the
list ofcriteria in determining the model's design. Therefore it is prob-
ably at least as good as any other device: for exercises designed to
analyze business cycle cyclicality on a quantitative basis.
1.6.1 An Index of Cyclicality
To assess the contributions of different factors and mechanisms in
the business cycle, an index ofcyclicality is defined. Sucha quantitative
index is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. Forthe present setofexercises,
we define the index as the sum ofthe absolute values ofthe differences
of the simulated values from their own trend values, divided by the
trend values. This division was done to weight the index by the relative
magnitude of the series. I5 Since the deviations are strongly serially
correlated, this statistic corresponds closely to cyclicality. The per-
centage deviations from trend are also plotted over time in numerous
figures, to indicate how much and when a particular factor contributed
to cyclicality during the simulation cycles.
1.6.2 The Tracking Simulation
The tracking simulation (Track Sim) is a full dynamic simulation of
real GNP, conducted from 1966 to 1983:2, using actual values for ex-
15. The formula used was
83:2 IX X I L simt - simtrendl_,
t=66: 1 Xsimtrendt
which provided a measure of deviations from trend, normalized for the position of X
relative to the trend at various points in the period 1966:1-1983:2. X sim was the simulated
value of real GNP, and Xsimtrend was the trend value generated by the simulation of real
GNP values in a given simulation. As particularcausal factors in the cycle were removed,
a simulationofthe result produced a new pattern relative to a new trend. The calculations
were repeated, and a summary statistic for reductions or increases in the cyclicality
index was used to measure the effects of the various factors on cyclical amplitude and
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Fig. 1.4 Mortgage repayments relative to disposable income: house-
holds, 1955:3 to 1983:4 (ratio). Shaded areas, precrunch/
crunch periods; cleararea, accumulation and reliquefication.
ogenous variables and inputting all individual equation errors as add
factors into the solution. 16 As a result, the tracking simulation repro-
duces history quite precisely. Given this baseline, it becomes possible
to show how removing certain causes of instability from history as
modeled reduces the recorded cyclicality. Both the direct and the prop-
16. Appendix 1.1 provides a fuller discussionofthe experimentalconditions underlying
each simulation. Tables showing the cyclicality index calculations for inflation and the
unemployment rate also are provided.69 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
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Fig. 1.5 "Quick" ratio: household sector, 1953:2 to 1983:4 (ratio of
household financial assets to total liabilities). Shaded areas,
precrunch/crunch periods; clear area, accumulation and
reliquefication.
agation effects of a particular factor can be, removed from the model,
and the resulting path ofbehavior for real GNP and other variables can
then be compared with the historical baseline.
This method of analysis assumes that the observed error terms are
not correlated with the sources ofinstability, an assumption that prob-
ably understates the effects ofremoving various sources ofinstability.
Errorterms mostlikely arepositivelycorrelatedwith measured sources




























Fig. 1.6 "Quick" ratio: nonfinancial corporations, 1953:4 to 1983:4.
Shaded areas, precrunch/crunch periods; clear area, accu-
mulation and reliquefication.
1.6.3 The Role of Noise in Creating Cyclicality
Frisch (1933) showed that an otherwise damped system can become
cyclical by the addition of random noise. The testing of this idea re-
quires a definition of"noise": it could be specified to include not only
the random errors of the equations, but also certain categories of ex-
ogenous shocks, including policies and coefficient uncertainty.
In the present exercise, in order to come closer to a taxonomy of
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Fig. 1.7 Debt service burden of nonfinancial corporations, 1953:2 to
1983:4 (estimated interest charges on outstanding short- and
long-term debt divided by cash flow). Shaded areas, pre-
crunch/crunch periods; c1<:~ar area, accumulation and
reliquefication.
errors were included, with exogenous shocks and policies left un-
changed. Although this is an impure measure ofnoise, since the resid-
uals of individual equations can reflect both systematic and random
elements, the high degree offit of most model equations suggests that
"approximate randomness" probably was an appropriate assumption.
In order to identify the contribution of "noise" to the fluctuations
ofreal GNP, a full historical dynamic simulation was run in which the72 Otto EcksteinlAllen Sinai
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Fig. 1.8 Ratio of short-term to total outstanding debt: nonfinancial
corporations, 1953:2 to 1983:4. Shaded areas, precrunch/
crunch periods; cleararea, accumulation and reliquefication.
equation errors were included and permitted to interact in the model
simulation. The contribution of "noise" was then identified by com-
paring the results of this simulation with the tracking simulation that
did not include the equation errors. Whereas the tracking simulation
showed a cyclicality index value of 1.449, the "no noise" simulation
indicated a comparable index value of 1.342, a reduction of 7.4%.
Noise, defined in this way, seems to have contributed significantly to
the recession of 1975; at other times the effect was small. Although



























Fig. 1.9 "Leverage" of nonfinancial corporations, 1953:2 to 1983:4
(total outstanding debt relative to assets, physical and finan-
cial, less total liabilities). Shaded areas, precrunch/crunch
periods; clear area, accumulation and reliquefication.
of reality, and it also sets the Frisch hypothesis in quantitative per-
spective (fig. 1.11 and table 1.6). The reduction in cyclicality may well
have been limited because of interactions in the full model simulation
that were not random.
1.6.4 The Oil Price Shocks
Thebusinesscycles since 1973 werepartly triggered bythe twojumps

















Fig. 1.10 Loan/depositratio: commercialbanks, 1959:1to 1983:4 (total
ofoutstandingcommercial and industrial, mortgage, and per-
sonal loans relative to demand and time deposits). Shaded
areas, precrunch/crunch periods; clear area, accumulation
and reliquefication.
with other destabilizing forces in the economy and with economic pol-
icies. A model solution removed the oil price shocks by replacing the
exogenous values for world crude oil prices by a steady 7.1% rate of
increase, a figure that left the terminal value for the oil price equal to
the actual result but removed any other variation from this shock vari-
able. Monetary policy was made to hold the path ofthe money supply
(MI) essentially unchanged, creating easier financial conditions. The7S' The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
result was a reduction in the cyclicality index from 1.449 to 1.219, for
a drop of 15.9% (fig. 1.12 and table 1.6).
The modesty of this result can partly be explained by the fact that
oil became a cyclical problem only in the selcond halfofthe simulation
period. As might be expected, the fluctuations in real GNP over 1973
to 1980 were reduced the most. If the cyclicality index is calculated
from 1974 on, its reduction is from 0.935 in the baseline to 0.688 under
no oil price shocks, or 26.4%. The experiment also was limited to the
price side ofthe oil problem; the supply disruptions, with theirgasoline
shortages and damage to consumerconfidence, createdadditional cycli-
cality but were not removed.
1.6.5 Stable Money Policy
One major potential source of instability is monetary policy, a key
impulse mechanism in the business cycle. Throughout the postwarera,
therehasbeencontroversyoverwhethermonetarypolicyhas stabilized
ordestabilized the business cycle. There has been considerable opinion
that monetary policy was too "stop/go," adding a large amount of
instability to the cycle.
Defining a stable monetary policy is difficult for a large-scale, struc-
tural econometric model that contains a full complement of policy
instruments. The reserve components of tht~ monetary aggregates, re-
serve requirements, regulatory ceilings on deposit and loan interest
rates, the discount rate, and selective controls on margin requirements
and loan down payments all have formed part ofpolicy. 17 For example,
to simply impose a smooth growth of nonborrowed bank reserves on
history would still leave a highly unstable financial system, because
interest rate ceilings, reserve requirements, and selective controls could
still be operative. Variations in the growth ofpotential GNP, inflation,
and other factors would convert smooth r(~serve growth into highly
unstable paths for the various monetary aggregates and interest rates,
probablyfor GNP, and would still leave business and household balance
sheets buffeted by disturbances. 18
A simulation was developed that dealt at least partially with these
problems. In "stable money policy," all deposit rate ceilings were re-
moved, extreme changes of reserve requirements over the simulation
period were eliminated, and open market operations on reserves were
eased when monetary policy was tight and tightened when monetary
policy was easy. The monetarist policy after 6 October 1979 was mit-
17. There has been one instance of outright credit controls, in spring 1980. For some
analysis of this episode, see Brimmer and Sinai 1981.
18. Such a simulation actually produced a higher cyclicality index than for the Track
Sim, 1.727, or a 19.1% increase.76 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
igated by limiting the range of interest rate volatility between 1979:4
and 1982:4.
Theresult was a reduction in the cyclicality indexfrom 1.449 to 1.127
for a relatively large drop of22.2%, offering support for the notion that
monetary policy was destabilizing from 1966 to 1983 (fig. 1.13 and table
1.6). The biggest improvements occurred in 1966, between 1976 and
1980, and in 1981-82, periods generally recognized as having been
characterized by a too tight or over expansive monetary policy.
1.6.6 No Oil Shocks, Stable Money Policy
Removing both the cyclicality induced by the oil price shocks and
the variations in monetary policy led to an even larger reduction in the
cyclicality index, to 1.055, or 27.2% (fig. 1.14 and table 1.6). It was
surprising that there was not a stronger interaction effect. Removing
both sources ofinstability addedlittle toremoving only one. This result
was probably due to a less complete adjustment ofthe assumed mon-
etary policy rather than to the different oil price assumptions. The
combination of the two did limit the swings in almost all the cycles,
however.
1.6.7 Simulating the Financial Factor
To examine some effects on postwar business cycles of the factors
that characterize the crunch and reliquefication stages, a component
by component removal of some major ingredients in the flow offunds
cycle was attempted.
First, a critical factor in all the crunches and subsequent upturns,
tight money and disintermediation, was eliminatedfrom theTrack Sim.
This was accomplishedinthe stablemoneypolicy simulation(described
in section 1.6.5 and fig. 1.13). The greatest improvement occurs be-
tween 1976 and 1983 because an over expansive monetary policy, then
extremely restrictive policy, and wide swings in interest rates are at-
tenuated. The lifting of deposit rate ceilings prevented the disinter-
mediation of funds that characterized periods of boom and financial
strain. The brief expansion of 1980-81 was more pronounced than in
actual history, since interest rates were prevented from rising as high
as actually occurred.
A second ingredient in the experiment was the removal ofexcessive
loan demands by both households and businesses, thus toning down
the boom ingredient ofcrunches as it affected the financial system and
limiting the pressure on banks that is a major source ofrapidly accel-
erating interest rates. The resulting behavior of real GNP with stable
monetarypolicy, limited disintermediation, and less fluctuation in loans
is shown in figure 1.15. Here the cyclicality index is a low 0.994, for
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Fig. 1.11 No "noise" simulation compared with Track Sim (percent-
age of trend). Track Sim-_.; no noise------.
Finally, the oil price shocks also were renl0ved (stable money policy,
no oil shocks, no crunch), thus mitigating the inflation ingredient of
the crunch periods in 1973-74 and beyond. Although not fully elimi-
nating the accelerating inflation ofthese episodes, limiting the pace of
increases in OPEC prices to7.1% perannum servedto show the effects
oflesser inflation rates interacting with financial phenomena. The cy-
clicality index was only 0.960 in this simulation (fig. 1.16 and table 1.6).
Thus, with stable money policy, no disintermediation, lessenedboom
effects on private sector loan demands, and lower inflation because of78 Otto Eckstein!ADen Sinai
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Fig. 1.12 No oil shocks simulation compared with Track Sim (per-
centage oftrend). Track Sim--; no oil shocks ------.
no oil price shocks, fully 33.7% ofthe original deviations in real GNP
from trend were eliminated. Figures 1.17 to 1.23 also show that re-
moving these factors greatly reduced the interest rate fluctuations and
financial instability that actually occurred, as indicated by various sum-
mary measuresofsectoralbalance sheetsandliquidity. Itwas inevitable
that interest rates would be better behaved with monetary policy
smoother, not exhibiting the large swings ofactual history.
Figure 1.16 reveals thatanoscillation mechanismremained, butwith-
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Fig. 1.13 Stable money policy simulation compared with Track Sim
(percentage oftrend). Track Sim--; stable money ------.
simulations of figures 1.14 to 1.16, as an endogenous response, sug-
gesting that the series of interrelated shocks portrayed in these simu-
lations were themselves a kind of propagation mechanism.
The flow offunds cycle and its ingredients thus appear to have op-
erated as both an impulse and a propagation .mechanism. In the model,
the impulse comes mostly from changes in nonborrowed reserves and
the resulting fluctuations of interest rates. Interest rates affect asset
allocation, spending, and borrowing behavior. Reactions in stock prices,
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Fig. 1.14 Nooil shocks, stable moneypolicy simulationcomparedwith
Track Sim (percentage of trend). Track Sim--; no oil
shocks, stable money ------.
follow. Prices and wages, then interest rates, react further, imparting
additional motionto the system. As real andfinancial stocks are altered,
the numerous stock adjustment or multiplier/accelerator mechanisms
that permeate the financial and real systems ofthe United States econ-
omy are activated.
1.6.8 A Simple Cycle Exercise on the Propagation Mechanism
To gain some insight into the dominantfeatures ofthe cyclical mech-
anism in the economy as depicted in the DRI model, a simple multiplier
exercise was run. Nonmilitary federal purchases ofgoods and services81 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
Table 1.6 Sources of Cyclicality in Postwar Business Cycles
Results ofDRI Model Simulations, 1966 to 1983:2
Percentage























Stable money policy, no








demands, no oil shocks,
stable money policy, no
crunch 0.482 -66.7 2.9
Note: Calculated for fluctuations in real gross national product.
aThe trend growth for each was calculated from a regression for an exponential trend.
were boosted by $10 billion and set to grow at the growth rate of
potential GNP thereafter. How does the economy absorb such a stim-
ulus? Does it lead to explosive growth, a stable multiplier, or a tem-
porary multiplier portraying a business cycle? Figure 1.24 shows the
multiplier, holding the money supply unchanged, peaking at 1.25 during
the first year, dropping to 0.5 in year five, and reaching zero in year
eight.
Table 1.7 shows thatconsumption reacts in the conventional Keynes-
ian fashion, responding to the increased in(~ome created by the fiscal
stimulus. Interest rates rise promptly, immediately producing the be-
ginnings ofa reduction in residential construction. In part, this is due
to reductions of nonborrowed reserves in order to maintain a fixed
money supply (nonaccommodating money). Business fixed investment
initially is boosted slightly, as sales expectations are revised upward
along with expectations on capacity utilization rates, inducing extra
investment. By the second year, the higherinterestrates begin tocrowd
out business fixed investment, and after three years the reduction is
substantial. Under an accommodating monetary policy, defined as un-
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Fig. 1.15 Stable money policy, no crunch simulation compared with
Track Sim (percentage of trend). Track Sim--; stable
money policy, no crunch ------.
The crowding out occurs not only because interest rates are higher,
but also because the stronger economy gradually converts the larger
nominal GNP into higher prices. Figure 1.25 shows the output/inft~tion
transform, a plot of the percentage of the increase in nominal GNP
that represents increased real activity. In year one, when the outputl
inflation transform (OIT) is equal to or near unity, nearly all the gain
in gross national product is real. But after eight quarters it is down to
0.7, and after twelve quarters it is 0.5. By year seven the OIT is zero,
so that the entire stimulus is converted into higher prices.
The results of this solution are largely, but not entirely, due to the
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Fig. 1.16 Stable money policy, no crunch, no oil shocks, no crunch
simulation compared with 'frack Sim (percentage of
trend). Track Sim--; stabIle money, no crunch, no oil
shocks ------.
out. If nonborrowed reserves are left unchanged, the multiplier is ini-
tially larger, equal to 1.48, and remains above unity for overfive years.
Nonetheless, there is a gradual reduction ofthe multiplierfrom its peak
value, mainly owing to increased inflation, higher interest rates, and a
using up ofthe financial baseofthe economyas measured by household
and business balance sheets.
The traditional cyclical mechanisms, the stock flow adjustments of
business and household fixed capital, play a rather minor role. The
stock of business capital enters the investm.ent equation with a small
but positive sign. Apparently the increased opportunity for investment84 Otto Eckstein!ADen Sinai
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Fig. 1.17 Mortgage repayments relative to disposable income: house-
holds, 1966:1 to 1983:1 (before and after removing unstable
Fed policy, crunch, and oil shocks). Track Sim--; stable
money, no crunch, no oil shocks ------.
created by replacement and modernization outweighs the negative ac-
celeratoreffect. Inventoryinvestmentdoesfollow the stockadjustment
mechanism, but the coefficients are not large and the adjustments are
quick. Household capital stocks, both for cars and homes, do have an
impact through negative feedback, but theiroverallimportance is small
in comparison to the financial and inflationary reactions.
When money is not accommodating, much greater rises of interest
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Fig. 1.18 "Quick" ratio: household sector, 1966:1 to 1983:2 (before
and after removing unstable Fed policy, crunch, and oil
shocks). Track Sim--; stable money, no crunch, no oil
shocks ------.
final demands through reduced flows of funds and negative balance
sheet effects. Increased debt service cuts business fixed investment,
and reduced household net worth lowers consumption. Even the out-
lays of state and local governments are cut by reduced revenues and
higher interest rates. When money is accommodating, the negative
feedback originates in the output/inflationtransform. As theinitial stim-
ulus converts into higher prices, real income gains are lost, and the
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Fig. 1.19 "Quick" ratio: nonfinancial corporations, 1966:1 to 1983:2
(before and after removing unstable Fed policy, crunch, and
oil shocks). Track Sim--; stable money, no crunch, no oil
shocks ------.
exports, housing, consumption (via consumer confidence), and in-
vestment. In any event, monetary policy never has retained a fully
accommodative stance in the face ofincreasing inflation.
1.6.9 Remaining Sources ofCyclicality
The simulations show some effect on the trend growth rate of real
GNP. Whereas the historical growth rate was 2.8% per annum from
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Fig. 1.20 Debt service burden of nonfinancial corporations, 1966:1 to
1983:2 (before and after removing unstable Fed policy, crunch,
and oil shocks). Track Sim--; stable money, no crunch,
no oil shocks ------.
removing the variability ofthe increase in the world price ofoil boosted
trend GNP growth to 3.0%, and adding stable money policy raised it
to 3.1%. Thus instability does appear to reduce trend growth, partly
byleaving unemploymenthigh and partly by reducing the rateofcapital
formation and therefore the growth ofaggregate supply.
The cyclicality that remains after the removal ofthe oil price shocks,
stop/go monetary policy, and certain elements ofthe crunch is consid-88 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
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Fig. 1.21 Ratio of short-term to total outstanding debt: nonfinancial
corporations, 1966:1 to 1983:2 (before and after removing
unstable Fed policy, crunch, and oil shocks). Track Sim
--; stable money, no crunch, no oil shocks ------.
erable, however-still 66.3% of the total experience. The possible
sources ofcyclicality that remain are extensive (table 1.5).
The United States government budget and fiscal policies may well
have beendestabilizing, particularly during the buildupfor the Vietnam
War and as a result of Reaganomics. The price controls of 1971-74
contributed to peak inflation, which in turn was a major factor con-
tributing to thelarge 1974-75recession. Theworldfood priceexplosion



















66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
Fig. 1.22 ''Leverage" of nonfinancial corporations: nonfinancial cor-
porations, 1966:1 to 1983:2 (before and after removing un-
stable Fed policy, crunch, and oil shocks). Track Sim--;
stable money, no crunch, no oil shocks ------.
1970 affected the macro data. The two disruptions in the availability
of gasoline supplies caused consumer sentiment to collapse, shifting
the consumption function downward and worsening the recessions of
1974-75 and 1980.19
Variations in aggregate supply also contribute to the large residual
cyclicality. Our index was calculated on the basis of an exponential
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Fig. 1.23 Loan/deposit ratio: commercial banks, 1966:1 to 1983:2 (be-
fore and after removing unstable Fed policy, crunch, and oil
shocks). Track Sim--; stable money, no crunch, no oil
shocks ------.
trend. Aggregate supply did not grow so smoothly, however, because
of demographic variations and changes in the productivity trend. In-
deed, a cyclicality index calculation for aggregate supply, as measured
by potential GNP, had a value of 0.649, or 45% of the cyclicality of
actual real GNP. Although the timing ofthe supply variations does not
coincide perfectly with the business cycle, there was sufficient coin-
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Fig. 1.24 Multiplier, civilian federal purchases. Sustained $10 billion
rise, unchanged money supply.
To test further the sources ofcyclicality, simulations were performed
that set each ofthe major volatile components ofprivate sector aggre-
gate demands equal to their trend growth paths.20 These included (1)
consumption of durable goods, (2) business fixed investment, and (3)
inventory outlays, all in real terms, and (4) housing starts. Another
simulation set all the growth paths at trend. Finally, a combined sim-
20. Values of add factors, the intercept terms in the key behavioral equations, were
selected to set the various spending components on their trend growth paths. There was
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Fig. 1.25 Output/inflation transform, civilian federal purchases up $10
billion (fixed money supply).
ulation of the final demand trend growth paths with the stable money
policy, no oil shocks, and no crunch case 'was performed. The intent
here was to identify the real final demands that were major sources of
cyclicality over 1966 to 1983. The results are summarized in table 1.6.
From the table, it can be seen that of the real final demands that
were considered, durable consumption spending was the major source
of cyclicality. Setting the growth in durable consumption at trend re-
duced the cyclicality index to 0.985, a reduction of32% from the Track
Sim value. The multiplier/accelerator impacts of smoothing this major94 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
componentoffinal demand, more evenimpacts onthe financial markets
through consumer loans and deposit flows, and a more stable perfor-
mance for household balance sheets contributed to the lessened
cyclicality.
Setting housing starts at its mean value resulted in the next largest
reduction in cyclicality, with the cyclicality index falling from 1.449 to
1.032, a reduction of28.8%. While somewhat surprising in that it was
a lesserfactor than durable consumption in cyclical behavior, this result
supports the highly cyclical role ofhousing indicated in earlier exper-
iments and most of·the literature. In a sense, housing starts can be
thought ofas related to consumption spending. Surprisingly, business
fixed investment and fluctuations in inventories accounted for the least
amount ofcyclicality.
With all the more volatile elements ofreal final demands set at trend,
the cyclicality index was 0.571, down 60.6% from the value of the
historical Track Sim. Ofcourse such an exercise begs the question of
the "causes" for the fluctuations, but it does permit an assessment of
the domestic private, nonpolicy sources of cyclical behavior.
Finally, in addition to stabilizing the real final demands, removing
the oil price shocks, stabilizing monetary policy, and eliminating the
volatility ofloans stemming from the crunch and reliquefication stages
in the flow offunds cycle, produced a cyclicality index value of0.482.
Figure 1.26 shows the resulting behavior ofreal GNP relative to trend,
where the cyclicality is 66.7% less than in the Track Sim. Again, how-
ever, considerable volatility remains, reflecting the propagation mech-
anisms in the system and suggesting that a full removal of cyclicality
is not possible in the real world.
1.7 Conclusions
What are the causes of the business cycle in the postwar era? It is
very clear that impulse mechanisms have been crucial. Large shocks,
ranging from OPEC oil price changes to shifts in monetary policy and
credit crunches, were responsible for up to one-third ofthe cyclicality
of the United States economy from 1966 to 1983:2, using a very con-
servative measure. Of the various components of aggregate demand,
changes in durable consumption spending and residential construction
accounted for a large amount ofcyclicality. Small shocks, on the other
hand, as measured by the equation errors of the DRI model, seemed
to be ofminor significance. Ourexaminationofthe internal propagation
mechanisms was very incomplete. Calculated as a residual, after re-
moving a large number of impulse mechanisms, it is about one-third
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Fig. 1.26 Autonomous final demands at trend, stable money policy, no
oil shocks, no crunch simulation compared with Track Sim
(percentage oftrend). Track Sim--;autonomous real final
demands, stable money, no oil shocks, no crunch ------.
cyclicality thus remains" suggesting that a balanced growth path for
the economy was and is not attainable.
One essential business cycle mechanisITl appears to have been fi-
nancial, especially since a near-monetarist approach has been taken to
monetary policy, and was estimated to provide a 31.4% reduction in
cyclicalityover 1966 to 1983:2 (table 1.6; stable money policy, no crunch).
Ifa boom in real activity or an unacceptable rate ofinflation develops,
the central bank causes these phenomena of the upswing to be con-96 Otto Eckstein!Allen Sinai
verted into crowding out, credit crunches, and recessions. Other stock
flow adjustments are numerous but do not seem to add much to
cyclicality.
Has the business cycle changed in the postwar era? Have there been
changes in the mechanisms? On the surface, an affirmative answer
might be suggested to both of these questions. As figure 1.1 and 1.2
and table 1.2 show, expansions and recessions have become more pro-
nounced with severe, volatile, and longer recessions in the later years
of the postwar era. But from our experiments it is not clear that any
significant changes really occurred. From the model simulations, the
apparent result is that shocks matter most, whether external shocks
stemming from policy orinflation or "internal shocks" taking the form
ofautonomous shifts in consumption and investment. The propagation
mechanism that transmits their effects to the rest of the economy re-
mains intact. The simulations show changing amplitudes from a series
of shocks that acted as impulses. But figures 1.16 and 1.26 show con-
tinuing oscillations that were not fully eliminated in the simulations
with the least cyclicality. This suggests that the inherent business cycle
mechanisms are unchanged and that a greaterfrequency ofshocks was
responsible for the more violent recent episodes. Also, if a balanced
growth path exists, it was not achieved during the past twenty years.
Forthe future, these results suggest it is highly unlikely that a balanced
growth path can be attained.
Thefactors most responsible for the increasingcyclicalityofbusiness
activity were revealed in the results of the computer simulations on
the effects of OPEC price shocks, the extremes and mechanisms of
monetary policy, financial crises and instability, and their interaction.
Smoothing orremoving these factors substantially reduced the severity
of the business cycles between 1966 and 1983 through the business
cycle mechanisms that are structured in the DRI model. The business
cycles did not disappear but were mitigated in severity, duration, and
the extreme behavior that actually occurred, suggesting that, despite
appearances to the contrary, an intrinsic cyclical mechanism remained.
While the factors associated most with greater cyclicality generally
would be classed as exogenous, the monetary policy responses of 1966
to 1983 certainly were greatly conditioned by the presence ofworsening
inflation. Supply side cost shocks, particularly from OPEC oil price
increases, reverberated through the price/wage mechanism in the United
States economy to raise inflation and alter inflation expectations to a
large degree, eventually requiring a strong response by the centralbank
to limit the inflation. And even these shocks had an endogenous ele-
ment, of course.
One surprising result is that autonomous changes in real durable
consumptionwere found to be a greatersource ofcyclicality than either97 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
housing, business fixed investment, or inventory fluctuations. 21 The
latter components ofreal final demands are most often considered the
key elements in short-run business fluctuations. But durable consump-
tion has taken a largershare oftotal aggregate demand overthe postwar
years. And given its large absolute size, the derived real and financial
effects from shifts in this category of spending are now considerable.
As for the propagation mechanisms, several factors underlying the
business cycle have been altered in the postwar period and do suggest
some changes. The changed approach to monetary policy over the
1970s and early 1980s has altered the propagation mechanism and is
surely the single most identifiable change. Monetary policy changed
from free reserves and interest rate targeting in the 1960s to monetary
growth targeting vis-a-vis the federal funds rate in the 1970s, and then
quite radically in the period 1979-82 to reserve growth and freely
fluctuating interest rates. The predominant change in structure oc-
curred with the New Fed Policy of October 1979 and has been dem-
onstrated here to be a major source of cyclical instability since then.
In the DRI model, wide fluctuations of interest rates induce wide
swings in spending and borrowing behavior that in turn feed back to
sustain the volatility of interest rates. The change in monetary policy
that unhinged interest rates from Federal Reserve control inevitably
had to create substantial instability in both financial and real markets.
The simulation (stable money policy) that had Federal Reserve policy
return to stabilizing interest rates over 1979:4 to 1983:2 produced a
much more damped performance in the economy than actually oc-
curred. Some interest rate effects ofthe unanticipated monetary policy
shock of the New Fed Policy also were removed in other simulations
with similar results.22
Second, the housing cycle, though just: as volatile as in previous
years, has been affected by changing patterns in mortgage finance and
interest rates. Simulations ofa less volatile monetary policy with more
stable interest rates worked, in part, through the housing cycle as a
major component of business cycles. Tight monetary policy, high in-
terest rates, and disintermediation have always been major causes of
instability in housing and construction as an impulse mechanism to
shorter-run fluctuations. Whereas the periods from the mid-1950s to
the late 1970s were characterized principally by availability of funds
constraints on housing activity, the deregulation offinancial institutions
and the removal of interest rate ceilings now has thrown the burden
of adjustment on demand and affordability. Much greater fluctuations
21. This result provides empirical support for the hypotheses of Hall, discussed in
chapter 4.
22. See Brimmer and Sinai 1981 for an attempt to quantify the effects from the New
Fed Policy in simulations with the DRI model.98 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
in interest rates now seem to be required for a given cyclical movement
in housing, throwing the rest ofthe interest rate sensitive areas ofthe
economy into a more volatile cyclical pattern.
Finally, also important in recent years have been the globalization
ofeconomic activity and the effect onthe dollaroffluctuating exchange
rates. Increased trade, interest rate, and capital linkages are transmit-
ting the business cycle, though the adoption offlexible exchange rates
may serve as a partial buffer. Morefundamentally, the worldwide boom
of 1971-73 and the post-OPEC experience suggest that the business




The historical tracking simulation was obtained by removing the
errors of a dynamic historical simulation through offsetting equation
add factors. In each quarter, an add factor equal to the simulated error
of each behavioral equation and opposite in sign was inserted (about
five hundred behavioral equations were involved). After several iter-
ations, the solution converged on the actual historical data, producing
a model-based tracking ofhistory on which other simulation exercises
could be performed.
2. No Noise
The "no noise" simulation represented an attempt to simulate the
effects ofrandom shocks on the cyclicality ofthe United States econ-
omy from 1966:1 to 1983:2. A full solution ofthe model overthis period
was run, with actual historical values inserted for all exogenous vari-
ables and the solved values for each endogenous variable fed back into
the right-hand side ofthe equations in current and subsequent periods.
No add factors were used in the behavior equations for this simulation.
The resulting residuals comprised two components: individual equa-
tion and interactive model simulation errors. In a properly specified
model, with appropriate properties for the estimated parameters, both
the equation and model simulation errors would be random and could
be assumed to reflect "noise." The reduction in cyclicality from the
Track Sim ofthis simulation thus represents an approximation, defined
in this way, of the effects from noise over the simulation period. To
the extent that the equation or model simulation errors contain non-
randomcomponents, certainlylikely in a large-scale macroeconometric99 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
model simulation, the reduction in cyclicality from history would be
understated.
3. No Oil Shocks
The overall purpose ofthis simulation was to remove the variability
ofinflation created by the OPEC oil price shocks. The DRI model has
a well-defined energy sector (Eckstein 1983, 234-45) that serves three
functions: "to trace the effects ofexogenous prices to the retail stage,
to provide a supply-demand check to see ifavailable supplies can sus-
tain particular levels ofeconomic activity, and to determine the effects
on potential GNP and productivity."
One way to examine the effect of the severe OPEC inflation on the
business cycle was to create a new more stable time path for oil prices
and to have the model endogenously trace the implications.
Therefore in this simulation the only change made was in the series
for crude oil prices, the key exogenous input to oil and energy prices.
The prices of both domestic and foreign crude oil were lowered. Al-
though part ofthe OPEC disruption was through effects on supply and
production, no attempt was made to include them except through en-
dogenous reactions in the model. The only other change was in the
path of nonborrowed reserves, the key exogenous variable for mone-
tary policy, which was raised to produce an unchanged Ml from the
Track Sim over the simulation period. In effect this amounted to an
easing of monetary policy, since inflation rates generally were lower.
Interestrates were permitted to respond endogenously in this simulation.
4. Stable Money Policy
In this simulation, the objective was to remove from the business
cycle the variability stemmingfrom the widc~ swings in monetary policy
over 1966 to 1983. The Federal Reserve is generally agreed upon as
having been "tight" in 1966, "easy" in 1968, "tight" in 1969-70,
"easier" in 1971-72 with the advent of a wage/price freeze, "tight"
in 1973-74, "easy" in 1975-76, perhaps too easy in 1977-78, and
exceedingly tight in 1980-81.
The modeling ofmonetary policy is a cOlnplicated matter in a large-
scale macroeconometric model, involving not only movements in the
money supply but also variables like bank reserves, legal reserve re-
quirements, deposit rate interest ceilings, and loan down payment con-
ditions. Since the money supply, whether measured as Ml, M2, or M3,
is an endogenous variable, monetary policy is not implemented by
controlling the growth in the money supply. Instead, changes in the
pattern of nonborrowed reserves, reserve requirements and required
reserves on demand and time deposits, deposit and loan interest rate100 Otto Eckstein/ADen Sinai
ceilings, the discount rate and sometimes loan-to-value ratios are the
mechanisms.
The general approach was to impose more stability on the path of
monetary policy, as measured by the exogenous policy instruments.
Large shifts in monetary policy, as measured by the growth in non-
borrowed reserves and changes in reserve requirements, were reduced
in those periods ofknown easy or tight monetary policy by smoothing
the growth ofnonborrowed reserves and raising reserve requirements
when the Federal Reserve had lowered them and lowering reserve
requirements when the Federal Reserve had raised them. Monetary
policy thus wa~ tightened when it had been easy and eased when it
had been tightened. The timing of these historical changes also was
altered, with the undoing ofthe historical changes in monetary policy
implemented early rather than late, given the lags between changes in
monetary policy and the effects on the economy. Regulation Qdeposit
rate ceilings were removedduring the historicalperiod, thus eliminating
a major distortion in relative interest rates that was responsible for
much ofthe disintermediation that occurred from 1966 to 1980.
The first major policy lever considered was legal reserve require-
ments. The DRI model has two legal reserve requirement variables-
one for demand deposits and one for time deposits. For the sake of
simplicity, total required reserves was smoothed, using legal reserve
requirements ondemanddeposits, the more erratic ofthe two variables.
This change had a significant impact on the interest rate block ofthe
model, both through a free reserves equation and also directly in in-
dividual interest rate equations. These equations include the federal
funds rate equation, the three-month treasury bill rate equation, the
prime interest rate equation, and the consumer installment rate equa-
tion. These in tum have a simultaneous impact on other short-term
interest rates, on yield curves, and to a lesser extent on longer-term
interest rates.
Another policy instrument altered was deposit interest rate ceilings.
Thehistoricalceilings onratesfor large certificates ofdeposits, deposits
at commercial banks, deposits at savings and loan associations, and
deposits at mutual savings banks were all removed. Deposit interest
rates thus rose above historical ceilings during tight money periods and
prevented the massive disintermediation that actually occurred. There
was some simultaneous impact upon other short-term interest rates as
well.
Nonborrowed reserves also were changed directly, made to grow
more rapidly in periods when growth was very low or negative and
limited in growth during times of rapid increase to tone down the
periods ofaggressively easier monetary policy.101 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
To mitigate the effects ofthe New Fed Policy after 1979:4; nonbor-
rowed reserves were altered to limit the swings in key short-term in-
terest rates. This variable has a strong impact on short-term interest
rates, especially the federal funds and treasury bill rates, and operates
by altering free reserves. There is also a smaller impact on longer-term
rates through a liquidity variable in the key long-term corporate bond
rate equation.
5. No Oil Shocks, Stable Money Policy
This simulation was constructed by combining the changes made in
the no oil shocks and stable money policy simulations. The one alter-
ation was to eliminate the change in the no oil shock simulation by
adjusting nonborrowed bank reserves to retain Ml at its baseline path.
Otherwise, all changes were as described in simulations (3) and (4).
6. Stable Money Policy, No Crunch
This simulation used the stable money policy exercise as a base and
included all the changes in it. Tight money and disintermediation was
essentially eliminated as a crunch ingredi(~nt in this exercise. But in
addition several elements of the credit crunch and reliquefication ex-
perienced during this simulation period were removed.
The growth patterns ofcertain loan and asset variables were smoothed
throughout the simulation interval to remove the effects on interest
rates and real final demands brought by volatile credit growth and asset
accumulation and decumulation. Those variables smoothed were com-
mercial and industrial loans at all large wec~kly reporting banks, loans
to individuals, outstanding mortgage loans and commitments, borrow-
ing by nonfinancial corporations at banks, and issues of commercial
paper by nonfinancial corporations, all of which exert considerable
upward pressure on interest rates late in expansions and put downward
pressure on interest rates in recessions. Household and business bal-
ance sheets also were made more stable as a result, as asset/debt ratios
were less volatile. The rate ofgrowth in th(~se categories ofborrowing
was reduced during the credit crunch periods. The loan variables di-
rectly influence short-term interest rates and indirectly affect the de-
posit flows and balance sheets of households, nonfinancial corpora-
tions, and state and local government.
A financial variable that was adjusted was household financial assets,
which consists of household holdings of money, deposits, bonds, and
equity. In credit crunches, the growth of household financial assets is
considerably diminished. Instead, the growth in this variable was in-
creased during credit crunches, easing one ofthe major negative house-
hold balance sheet inputs to the business cycle. Household financial102 Otto EcksteinlAllen Sinai
assets influence household net worth, the peIformance of the stock
market, and also the final demands ofreal personal consumption.
7. Stable Money Policy, No Oil Shocks, No Crunch
This simulation combined the changes and features of the stable
money policy, no oil shocks, and no crunch simulations, removing the
cyclicality brought about by "stop/go" monetary policy, the oil price
shockinflation, and several elements ofthe crunchprocess. Inessence,
almost all the ingredients ofthe "financialfactor" in the business cycle
were smoothed as a result.
8. Autonomous Real Final Demands
In this simulation, the more volatile components of final demands
were exogenized at trend values one by one, then all together. These
were, specifically, personal consumption expenditures ofdurable goods
in real terms, gross fixed private nonresidential investment in real terms,
the total change in real business inventories, and housing starts. These
variables were constrained to grow at their historical levels over the
entire simulation interval; housing starts were set at their mean value
for the period.
In the DRI model, most of these variables enter directly into real
gross national product. However, feedback effects influenced some
other variables, with endogenous reactions permitted elsewhere, ex-
cept back on the final demand category that was exogenized.
9. Autonomous Real Final Demands, No Oil Shocks, Stable Money
Policy, No Crunch
This simulation combined the exogenizing ofthe various components
ofreal final demands at trend growth rates and the characteristics and
underlying features of the no oil shocks, stable money policy, and no
crunch solutions to remove most of the suspected major sources of
volatility during the simulation period. All the changes described in the
relevant simulations above were combined for this exercise.
Appendix 1.2
Expectations and Econometric Models
The role ofexpectations in the business cycle has not yet been fully
and systematically explicated or empirically determined. The "new
macroeconomics" provides an equilibrium theory of business cycles,
stressing the impact of unanticipated shocks as a source of cyclical103 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
Table 1.A.1 Sources of Cyclicality: Results of DRI Model Simulations,
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aSince the historical dynamic simulation gave a less cyclical result than the Track Sim,
the "gap" between potential and real GNP in the simulation did not widen as much as
in history, especially in downturns, producing a more cyclical result. Setting the final
demand components exogenously at trend growth values eliminated certain model feed-
back mechanisms on inflation that limit the usefulness of these results.
bn.m. = not meaningful.
movements and rationally formed expectations in making anticipated
changes in policy ineffective (Lucas 1975).
In the new theory, expectations affect the business cycle through
"disappointment" or "surprise" over monetary and fiscal policy ac-
tions. Unanticipated changes in monetary and fiscal policies perturb
the amplitude of the cycle, with the propagation of these shocks de-
pending on internal mechanisms.
The new expectations theory challenges econometric models on
several counts. First, conventional macroec·onomic models have often
been devoid of expectations phenomena and, where existing, derived
from historical dataofthe same series rather than "rationally" formed.
Specification errors may exist on both grounds, biasing the results in
the dynamic simulations of these models. Second, to the extent that
parameters (the structure) vary in response to policy changes, the
predictions of econometric models that are conditional on assumed
policies may be invalid or biased. More important for the business104 Otto EcksteinJAllen Sinai
Table I.A.2 Sources of Cyclicality: Results of DRI Model Simulations,
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cycle, anticipated changes in policy are believed to have no impact
on real variables or inflation, since the economic structure adjusts to
offset them. Third, the activity may really be equilibrium paths in a
world where information is rationally used, since markets have quickly
adjusted and learned in an efficient manner. These arguments, though
valid in certain circumstances, nevertheless must themselves be ques-
tioned. Expectations formation is not necessarily rational, but at times
can be adaptive and slow, depending upon the markets in question.
It is not clear that the errors potentially introduced by using a for-
mulation ofexpectations different from rational expectations are large
enough to perturb equation parameters sufficiently to render invalid
the approximate conclusions of econometric model simulations. It is
an empirical question whether significant variation occurs in structural
coefficients when policy is changed. Many policy changes are not
different enough from history to alter structural parameters by a large
amount.
Further, the notionthateconomicagents perceive and use the correct
structure in forming expectations is difficult to accept. A homogeneity
of views across decision makers on the determinants ofthe economy,105 The Mechanisms ofthe Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
interest rates, and responses to policy is very unlikely. Equilibriums
are not instantaneous: the real world is characterized by quarter-to-
quarter adjustments. Finally, only few economic markets are charac-
terized by quick, inexpensive, full information flows on those activities
relative to decisions. The flow ofinformation and reactions ofdecision
makers might be near perfect in the financial markets, but reactions in
labor and other markets are much less effi(;ient.
Comment Michael C. Lovell
I think I have an advantage in reading Eckstein and Sinai's paper, for
whereas courses in the business cycle are no longer offered at most
institutions, I was well trained; in the fall of1955-sixrecessionsago-
it was my pleasure to take a graduate course about business cycles
that was team taught by Gottfried HaberleT and Otto Eckstein. That
was a precomputer course; it was not until the following summer that
the dawn of modern computers at Littauer was marked by the arrival
of the Burroughs E101. That machine was the wonder of its day, for
it had 110 words of storage. Eckstein and Haberler taught a great
course, one of the last of its breed; at the time it was obvious to
everyone that Otto would go far, but I suspect that few of us in the
class anticipated that he would pass the market test so well, entrepre-
neuring business cycle forecasting on time-sharing computers.
The six recessions suffered by the Americaneconomy since Eckstein
and Haberler taught their course provide additional evidence on the
nature of business cycle phenomena. But in the interim the very ex-
istence ofthe business cycle came to be questioned: it was suggested
at one time that the business cycle was a topic that could be relegated
to economic historians; more than a decade: ago a former colleague of
mine, Martin Bronfenbrenner, edited a Social Science Research Coun-
cil volume entitled Is the Business Cycle Obsolete? and successful
macro texts avoid evena chapteron the business cycle. This conference
gives testimony that the business cycle is alive and sick. And we have
much to learn about business cycle phenomena from Eckstein and
Sinai's contribution.
Key Points
Let me begin by saying that to my mind the most surprising thing
about the contribution is that so much of it is so familiar. With the
exception of the simulation results of section 1.6, the Eckstein/Sinai
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paper closely resembles the Eckstein/Haberler course. Indeed, the
business cycle mechanism described is not that different from the one
discussed by Joseph Schumpeter in his Theory of Economic Devel-
opment and his two-volume Business Cycles; and much that is in the
paper would offer no surprise to readers of Burns and Mitchell. In
particular, Eckstein and Sinai follow Burns and Mitchell in stressing
the sheer complexity and irregularities of business cycle phenomena.
Letme mention some ofthe most strikingfeatures oftheircontribution:
1. They augment in a rather interesting way the standard NBER
business cycle chronology, as is most easily seen from table 1.3, which
chronicles five types of cyclical phenomena. The recovery expansion
dates and the recession dates are those of the NBER (in contrast to
Blinder's contribution to this volume, they stick to the official chro-
nology). Eckstein and Sinai have superimposed on this standard chro-
nology three types of "stages." The first of these are "booms." In
addition there is the "precrunch period/crunch" and the "reliquefi-
cation" stage. Reliquefication is a process that usually takes place near
the end of the recession but may be continuing while the recovery
phase is getting under way. The boom usually precedes the onset of
recession. Observe, however, that there is considerable irregularity,
testifying to the complexity of the phenomena under study; in partic-
ular, the precrunchperiod/crunchof1966 was notfollowed by recession
(though at one point the authors refer to a "growth recession"). And
the downturn of1960 was not preceded by a boom, which they attribute
to Eisenhower's efforts at balancing the budget.
2. Eckstein and Sinai present the "DRI boom monitor," which may
be a close cousin of the NBER coincident indicators; by identifying
periods of boom, they hope to determine more precisely the upper
turning point. It is plotted on figure 1.3, and its components are listed
on table 1.4. Note that it is a weighted average of eight components;
six are real indicators; one is a measure of credit conditions; the one
with smallest weight is the monetary base growth index, but in real
terms, which means it is notconsidereda policyinstrumentby monetar-
ists. It is interesting that in terms of their boom index the 1972:6 to
1973:11 boom is the biggest bang since World War II-perhaps the
magnitude ofthe Korean War boom is artificially downplayed because
of the cutback in new car sales.
3. While Eckstein and Sinai do not focus on any single measure of
monetary conditions, they do emphasize the importance ofthe financial
factor in referring to the "flow offunds cycle." To briefly summarize,
they explain that the precrunch period culminates in the crunch, which
they define "as a credit crisis stemming from the collision of an ex-
panding economy with a financial system that has been depleted of
liquidity." It is characterized by deteriorating balance sheets, sharply107 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
increasedinterestrates, a scramblefor available funds, depressed stock
markets, and the inability of many borrowers to obtain funds at any
cost. "The financial factor is a critical ingredient of the business
cycle....Butitis notjustmonetary policy thatinfluences thebusiness
cycle process; the feedback effects from borrowing, lending, stock-
flow processes in finance, balance sheets, changes in liquidity, and
financial risk affect cyclical behavior as well." If my memory serves
me right, there is not much in this description that would surprise either
John Maynard Keynes or Joseph Schumpeter.
4. While their paper does not blame the cycle on any single factor,
they do cast a few stones at the policymakers-Eisenhowerfor shifting
so abruptly toward the balanced budget in 1960 and the Fed for being
too contractionary in downturns and too expansionary in revivals. Thus
they state: "In virtually every precrunch pt~riod, the Federal Reserve
retained a restrictive monetary policy for longer than was necessary.
Similarly, periods of reliquefication often have been characterized by
a prolonged period ofexcessively stimulative monetary policy." They
argue that the October 1979 shift in Fed policy was a mistake, causing
the subsequent crunches to become more intense; also, the shift to
flexible exchange rates contributed to the globalization ofcyclical phe-
nomena in the 1970s.
5. Simulation results focusing on the sources of the business cycle
are conveniently summarized in section 1.6. They compare a variety
of alternative counterfactual simulations using an "index of cyclical-
ity," defined as the sum ofthe absolute value ofdeviations from trend
over the period 1966 to 1983:2. The results are conveniently summa-
rized on table 1.6, the middle column ofthat table being most informa-
tive. In the absence of random shocks (no noise), the cycle in real
output would have been 7.4% less severe. r~o oil price shocks would
have removed 15.9% of the cycle, and a stable money policy would
have smoothed out 22.2%. And table 1.7 shows the multiplier effect of
a $10 billion increase in real government spending, contrasting a fixed
money supply with unchanged nonborrowed reserves.
Critique
1. I suspect many readers of this paper will be upset; but I am sure
those sections that are most upsetting to some readers are likely to
receive strong applause from others.
Some will be upset because Eckstein and Sinai do not focus on any
single simple indicator of what the central bank is about-if they do
mention the rate ofM! growth once or twice, they also refer more than
a few times to free reserves.
Some readers may be upset because they do not advance a straight-
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inclination is to applaud Eckstein and Sinai for following Burns and
Mitchell in stressing the complexity of the business cycle; they ex-
plicitly reject monocausal explanations.
Others will be upset by the things they leave out. They have little to
say about the slowdown in productivity growth or rational expecta-
tions. And I am sure many will dissentfrom theirproclivitytodownplay
much that is new in the literature: "Some ideas from the recent liter-
ature, suchas asymmetric information, the misreadingofabsolute price
changes as relative price changes, the serial correlation introduced by
buffer inventory stocks into production, and lags in the wage/price
process, may be partofreality, buteventhe most cursory look atactual
history shows that they can be no more than a small partofit." Because
I believe the jury is still out on these issues, I myself am not upset on
these points. I am an agnostic, and I believe the pendulum of profes-
sional wisdom will be swinging back toward Eckstein and Sinai.
2. I think Eckstein and Sinai may not have adequately qualified the
results of their simulation runs. True, they do provide the following
cautionary note concerning the precision of their simulation results:
"This method of analysis assumes that the observed error terms are
not correlated with the sources ofinstability, an assumption that prob-
ably understates the effects ofremoving various sources ofinstability,
becauseerrorterms mostlikely are positivelycorrelatedwith measured
sources ofinstability." I believe this is an inadequate qualification; in
particular, readers mustbe cautionedaboutthe problemofspecification
error. And it would be useful to know how sensitive their simulation
results and multiplier estimates are to perturbing their parameter es-
timates within the indicated range of sampling error. No argument is
presented as to why the multiplier response profile presented in table
1.7 is any more creditable than any of the wide-ranging candidates
plotted for alternative models by Carl Christ in his article "Judging the
Performance of Econometric Models of the U.S. Economy" (Christ
1976). Some readers may suspect that the simulation results reported
in this contribution may be telling us more about the characteristics of
the DRI model than about the United States economy.
3. I also believe that their simulations do not constitute a definitive
exercise in counterfactual history. To illustrate, consider the "no oil
shocks" simulation reported in table 1.6. Potentially this is the most
interesting of simulations, not only for academic economists but also
for Detroit autoworkers who lost their jobs and New Englanders who
heat their homes with oil. According to their analysis, their cyclicality
index for the period 1973-80would have been 26.4% lower ifthe world
price of oil had climbed at a steady 7.1% rate over this period. While
removing the erratic jerks, this simulation leaves the price ofoil at its
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tion in cyclicalityis entirelydue to the erratic natureofthe price shocks,
leaving out the consequence ofsupply disruptions; and the simulation
does not purport to show how productivity and prices would have
behaved in the absence of OPEC price hikes.
In thinking about this exercise in counterfactual history, it seems
obvious that it should make a difference whether the experimental
effect was achieved through an increase in oil imports or by the im-
position ofprice ceilings, with accompanying shortages-the Eckstein!
Sinai simulation focuses only on the price effects. The consequence
would also depend upon whether the lower price for gasoline would
have prevented the shift away from Detroit's "gas guzzlers" to Japa-
nese minis. Research by Ohta and Griliches, as reported in the NBER
Digest (February/March 1984), reveals that tastes were stable but con-
sumers responded to changes in the price ofgasoline and the associated
changes in the implicit prices based on weight and size of cars. Un-
fortunately, Eckstein and Sinai do not explore the effect of stable pe-
troleum import prices on car sales and so forth; and they do not tell
us whether energy conservation expenditures by public utilities and
households are appropriately netted out; they do not tell us whether
they assume that the elimination of the petroleum price hikes would
influence the direction ofinvestment spending and the rate ofproduc-
tivity growth.
In the oil price shock simulation they held the historical time path
of the money supply (Ml) unchanged, which meant the interest rates
were made much lower. This simulation is not without interest, but it
is of greatest interest to those who believ(~ the money supply is ex-
ogenous-some may believe that the problems of the 1970s arose be-
cause the Fed spontaneously ran amok with the money supply; the
Eckstein!Sinai simulations suggest that, even so, elimination of price
shocks would have reduced the real-output cyclicality index by about
15.9%; it would have cut fluctuations in the rate of inflation by 10%
and achieved a 12.7% reduction in fluctuations in the unemployment
rate.
For those ofus who believe that Fed policy was responsive, rightly
or wrongly, to what was happening at the rnoment, an alternative set
of simulations is required in which monetary policy is treated as an
endogenous variable. The "stable money policy" simulations are a
step in this direction. For these simulations Eckstein and Sinai specify
that deposit ceilings are removed, extreme changes in reserve require-
mentsareeliminated, andopenmarketoperations onreserves areeased
when monetary policy was tight and tightened when monetary policy
was easy; the range ofinterest rate volatility was limited after 1979:4.
This is a very complex specification; and while I sympathize with their
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for one would find it interesting to have supplemental information on
the resulting time path ofinterest rates and the money supply.
They do report on a simulation simultaneously eliminating oil price
shocks and invoking a stable money policy. If I interpret their brief
discussion of this simulation correctly, they are having reserves and
interest rates follow the same time path as in the second simulation,
which means thatthepathofMl departs substantiallyfrom its historical
path.
4. I think what is needed are more DRI simulations better described!
It would be useful to simulate within the DRI model environment the
implications ofalternative assumptions (rules) about the determination
ofmonetary and fiscal policy. A number ofyears ago Edward Prescott
and I (Southern EconomicJournal, 1968) modeled alternative monetary
rules within a simple analytical framework-because which policy rule
worked best depended on the relative magnitude of the system's pa-
rameters, the basic questions of which policy was most appropriate
could not be resolved analytically. Appropriate simulations with the
DRI model would provide one set of answers to these fundamental
policy issues. One set of simulations would introduce monetary rules
attempting to model as closely as possible the actual decision rules of
the authorities. These would be contrasted with normative policy rules-
for example, constant money supply growth, leaning against the wind,
or stable interest rates. The relative success ofalternative policy rules
in coping with various types oflarge shocks, suchas OPEC price hikes,
should be explored by simulation.
Comment Kenneth J. Singleton
The paper by Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai focuses on the role ofthe
financial sector in both the generation and the propagation of cyclical
fluctuations in aggregate variables. I shall begin my comments by plac-
ing the analysis in this paper in a somewhat different light than the
authors have. Then I shall discuss the different phases ofthe business
cycle set forth by Eckstein and Sinai, as well as their taxonomy ofthe
mechanisms underlying the cycles, examining the theoretical under-
pinnings of the DRI model in relation to modern theories of portfolio
choice and consumption. Finally, I shall present some comments on
the simulations. Consistent with the focus of the paper, most of my
comments will address the specificationofthefinancial sectorin macro-
economic models.
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The optimaldecisions ofconsumers, firms, andgovernments embody
the structure offinancial markets through the budget constraints faced
by these agents. Thus the cyclical behavior ofsuch aggregates as GNP,
unemployment, and inflation is intimately related to the nature of the
financial instruments available for financing expenditures and for sav-
ing. In a frictionless world with complete contingent claims markets,
there would be many equivalent ways ofarranging financing to achieve
the optimal level and rate of growth of expenditures. Indeed, non-
interest-bearing money is typically a dominated asset in such an econ-
omy, in which case fiat money would not circulate in equilibrium.
Of course there are in fact many restrictions in the United States
and other countries that preclude certain types of financial contracts
or the provision ofcertain types ofinsurance and that limit the forms
ofthe contractual arrangements that can be achieved with the available
instruments. The time series properties of aggregate variables are af-
fected in important ways by these restrictions, so economies with and
without such restrictions imposed, though otherwise identical, may
behave very differently. Furthermore, changes in the types ofcontracts
and in communications technologies overtime will in general alter both
the amplitude and the periodicity ofmacroeconomic time series. 1 The
important role offinancial arrangements in the business cycle process
is the central theme ofthis paper.
Historically, the emphasis on the financial sector in models of busi-
ness cycles has varied. Fluctuation in interest rates has long been
recognized as a central factor in the determination of aggregate real
economic activity. However, as Eckstein and Sinai emphasize, much
less attention has been given to developing formal models ofthe busi-
ness cycle that account explicitly for disintermediation, bankruptcy
risk, and considerations of "liquidity."2 In sections 1.3 and 1.5, Eck-
stein and Sinai provide a useful and informative description of the
evolution of several financial aggregates during the postwar business
cycles, giving particular attention to the changes in the composition of
the balance sheets of firms, consumers, and financial intermediaries.
Both the magnitude and the timing of the changes in these financial
aggregates lead the authors to conclude that financial factors were
important for shaping the business cycle.
While these sections present clear evidence of a "flow of funds"
cycle, a detailed description of the mechanisms by which changes in
1. Some properties of the equilibria of monetary economies have been discussed
recently by Townsend 1982, Lucas 1983, and Bewley 1984, among others, underdifferent
assumptions about borrowing and insurance markets.
2. Many authors have, ofcourse, argued that these financial factors play an important
role in generating cycles. For instance, illiquidity and the bankruptcy offirms was a key
feature ofIrving Fisher's (1930) theory ofthe business cycle. These considerations have
not, for the most part, been incorporated into recent analytical models of aggregate
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credit variables affect real economic variables is not provided, beyond
several informal observations. Throughout their discussion they use
such terms as liquidity, credit availability, and insufficient financing,
butwithoutprovidingprecisedefinitions ofthese terms orgiving precise
reasons why these conditions obtain. It seems clear, however, that they
are implicitly making assumptions about the existence oflegal restric-
tions and transactions costs and about the nature of the contingent
claims markets that are excluded from their model. For instance, the
authors note thatthere has been substantialfluctuation in durable goods
purchases during the postwar period, but they do not provide a formal
description of the meChanisms that produced the fluctuation. Instead,
only a brief outline of the "mechanisms" of the business cycle is
displayed in table 1.5. Several ofthese mechanisms seem to refer im-
plicitly to the consequences ofincomplete contingent claims markets,
but the links between the inability to insure against certain types of
risks, illiquidity and bankruptcy, and durable goods purchases over the
cycle are not formalized. The imprecision here is unfortunate, since
precisely which markets are excluded and which legal restrictions are
imposed in an economic model have important implications for how
policies affect real economic activity through financial markets and
hence for the design and analysis of monetary and fiscal policies.3
Furthermore, ifliquidity and bankruptcyare as importantas Eckstein
and Sinai suggest, then different types ofconsumers and firms may be
affected differentially by economic events. Hence a distinction should
be made between those who are wealthy and less likely to be affected
by a financial crunch and those in the lower and middle income groups
who are most likely to be affected. By making this distinction, very
different time series properties for consumption and output in the pres-
ence of a given monetary and fiscal environment may emerge, com-
pared with the time series properties of a model with representative
agents. In particular, individual consumption may be much more vol-
atile and may exhibit quite different patterns of comovements with
interest rates than aggregate consumption. Some qualitative evidence
about the different time series properties of individual and aggregate
consumption in the presence of borrowing constraints is provided by
the simulations in Scheinkman and Weiss (1983). Their findings suggest
that substantially more insights into the financial factor in the business
cycle may be obtained by disaggregating by types ofindividuals (e.g.,
constrained and unconstrained) in the presence of restrictions on fi-
nancial contracting.
3. More generally, the assumptions about informational asymmetries on the part of
agents and the nature ofthe legal restrictions affect the nature of the financial contracts
that will be observed. Forinstance, Townsend 1984 shows thatthe typeofcommunication
technologies available affects the structure offinancial markets.113 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
The way expectations are introduced into a model also has important
implications for boththe magnitude and the ,cyclicality ofthe responses
of GNP to monetary and real shocks. The role of expectations in the
DRI model is described briefly in this papt:~r and more extensively in
Brimmer and Sinai (1981) and Eckstein (1983). In light ofthe evidence
that the credit crunch experience has been a systematic element in the
postwar business cycle and the general perception that expectations
are important determinants of the behavior of financial variables, an
evaluation of the expectational assumptions underlying the Eckstein/
Sinai analysis seems warranted.
For the most part, Eckstein and Sinai assume that agents form ex-
pectations adaptively according to a long distributed lag. The reasons
given for choosing this specification seem to represent misconceptions
about the properties ofdynamic economic nlodels. First, Eckstein and
Sinai (appendix 1.2) argue that the assumption ofrational expectations
implies that anticipated changes in policy have no effect on real vari-
ables. This interpretation of the rational expectations assumption is
incorrect. The assumption of rational expectations per se has no im-
plications for the effectiveness of systematic policy. Rather, it is the
underlying structural model, together with the expectational assump-
tion, that determines whether anticipated policy has real effects. In a
monetary model in which markets are inco:mplete and there are legal
restrictions on financial contracting, it seems likely that anticipated
monetary policy will have real effects under rational expectations.
Second, they argue that adaptive expectations processes are incor-
porated into the equations of the financial sector of the DRI model in
part because rational expectations requires a "quick adjustment" of
the economy to shocks. In fact, the assumption ofrational expectations
does not restrict the speed by which the economy adjusts to exogenous
shocks or how far into the past a rational agent looks when forming
expectations about the future. Such properties of a model are deter-
mined jointly by the structure ofthe model and the assumptions about
the expectations formation process.
Furthermore, such rigidities as long-term contracts are notincompat-
ible with the assumption of rational expectations. Recent studies of
price setting underasymmetric information have shown that wages and
prices may appear to be relatively unresponsive to economic events,
even though agents have rational expectations conditionedontheirown
information.4 An implication of this literature on optimal contracting
is that standard pricing formulas derived under symmetric information
do not apply. Eckstein and Sinai study labor market relations derived
under the assumption of symmetric information among workers and
4. See, for example, Hall and Lilien 1979 and Stiglitz and Weiss 1981.114 Otto Eckstein/ADen Sinai
firms. Iflong-term contracts are a consequence of imperfect informa-
tion, then it may be that, by studying a misspecified model, the authors
are led to the conclusion that expectations are formed extrapolatively
when they are in fact rational.
Before discussing in more detail the specification of the financial
sectorin the DRImodel, it will behelpful todigress briefly andcomment
on the specification of the consumption sector described in Eckstein
(1983). The theory underlying the consumption equation in the DRI
model is one in which a representative household maximizes the ex-
pected value of a two-period utility function. While not formally de-
duced from a complete specification ofthe economy, this relation em-
bodies a key feature of modern consumption theory. Namely,
consumption decisions today are affected by the returns on alternative
assets and the uncertainty about future consumption opportunities.
This risk is captured by the probability ofa contingency's arising, and
this probability is in tum a function of the current inflation and un-
employment rates and the variability of income.
The equations describing interest rates are based on a static theory
of portfolio selection, augmented by the introduction of adjustment
costs. This formulation virtually ignores the dynamic considerations
underlying the specification ofthe consumption equation. Modern the-
ories of portfolio choice and asset price determination proposed by
Merton (1971), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and others have forward
looking investors considering all moments of the distributions of the
variables in the models.5 Additionally, Eckstein and Sinai assume that
the yields onlong-term bonds are determined separatelyfrom the yields
on short-term securities, as in the model proposed by Feldstein and
Eckstein (1970). Their interest rate equation has long rates depending
principally on long-term price expectations formed according to an
adaptive learning process, and a measure of the policy controlled li-
quidity ofthe economy. Sargent (1971) has argued previously that this
"mongrel" equation, which represents an attempt to merge Fisher's
theory ofinterest with the liquidity preference theory, is not identified
as a structural equation. Thus there is little reason to expect that the
parameter estimates for this equation will bear any simple relation to
the true parameters ofagents' expectations ofinflation. Like the short-
rate equations, this relation is also not linked in an economically con-
sistent way to the real sectors of the economy.
The motivation for the introduction ofadjustment costs is that busi-
nesses cannot adapt their balance sheet portfolios fully in response to
5. In practice, it is often assumed that agents have quadratic objective functions and
face linear constraints, so that decision rules are linear (e.g., Hansen and Sargent 1980).
This is one rationalization for restricting attention to conditional first moments in models
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changing market conditions. The "need" for the introduction of ad-
justment costs in the financial sector in order to "fit the data" may
well be a consequence of the following features of the model. First,
the model is based on a static theory. In a dynamic, uncertain envi-
ronment, the portfolio decisions of COnSUITlerS and firms will in gen-
eral depend nonlinearly on the current and past values of variables
summarizing market conditions. Agents will typically adjust their port-
folios gradually over time as the optimal response to disturbances,
even when there are small transaction costs associated with portfolio
adjustments.
Second, the equations for the long-term bond rates use yields to
maturity as the dependent variables. It is vvell known that yields ob-
scure the links between nominal interest rates and movements in ex-
pected inflation or real interest rates. It is the pure discount bond
returns that convey information about the value of money in future
periods, not yields to maturity. The latter are a confounding of the
discount rates for all periods over the life of the security.
These observations are not intended to suggest that there are no
adjustment costs associated with financial transactions. There may be
adjustment costs induced, for instance, by such restrictions on financ-
ing as those mentioned at the outset of this discussion. However, if
such restrictions are present, then the static portfolio theory underlying
the analysis in this paper does not hold. The specification of the con-
sumers' optimum problems should explicitly incorporate these restric-
tions through the specification of the budget constraints.
For the purpose of discussing the role of the financial factor in the
business cycle, Eckstein and Sinai take the: constructs of a represen-
tative consumer and a representative firm as given. They argue that
the financial factor manifests itself most strongly during two stages of
the business cycle that heretofore were not considered explicitly as
part ofthe NBER business cycle stages: the credit crunch and relique-
fication stages. Here again their discussion leaves several important
questions unanswered. In particular, the basic issue ofwhat exogenous
and endogenous factors induce a credit crunch at the peak of a cycle
and the stage of "reliquefication" at the trough is not resolved. In
section 1.5.1 it is noted that no single factor is responsible for the onset
ofa credit crunch, and that a combination ofseveral factors "causes"
a crunch. A restrictive monetary policy is clearly an important ingre-
dient in generating a credit crunch. What is not clear is whether it is
a necessary ingredient. Will, for example, a crunch emerge whenever
certain legal restrictions and borrowing constraints become binding?
That is, can this stage of the business cycle be induced by both real
and nominal disturbances in the absence ofa restrictive monetary pol-
icy? Another question raised by this analysis in whether the monetary116 Otto Eckstein/ADen Sinai
authorities could prevent a credit crunch by acting differently in the
expansion phase of a business cycle.
The answers to these questions are likely to be model specific, which
further underscores the importance ofbeing precise about the structure
of financial markets. Of course, institutional and legal restrictions on
financial contracting are not easily modeled at a formal level. The
implied nonlinearities and inequality restrictions typically preclude
closed-form relations for the optimal consumption decisions or asset
prices. Similarly, the implications for economic behavior ofmoral haz-
ard and adverse selection under asymmetric information have to date
been analyzed only in the context of fairly simple models. Finally,
throughout the postwarperiod there have beenchanges in the operating
procedures of the Federal Reserve and important revisions in the tax
codes, and markets for new financial instruments have been estab-
lished. Accounting for all of these considerations in models of the
business cycle specified at the level of the objective functions of eco-
nomic agents is currently not feasible. Therefore, large-scale models
that introduce explicitly "frictions" in financial markets but have hy-
brid expectations schemes may provide some insights into the impli-
cations of such frictions for the business cycle.
TheDRI model represents in partthe productofanambitious attempt
at incorporating some of the many institutional and legal restrictions
on financial contracting into a macroeconomic model. Unfortunately,
no catalog ofthe restrictions ordescription ofthe way they are imposed
onthe decision rules ofagents in the DRI model is providedby Eckstein
and Sinai. This omission limits the potential insights about the role of
financial markets in the business cycle process that can be obtained
from the simulations reported in the final section ofthe paper.
Turning to the simulations, the effect ofremoving a particular source
ofshocks from the model is measure by a "cyclicality index," defined
as the normalized absolute deviations in real GNPfrom a trend growth
path. The index was calculated first with all sources ofshocks included
in the model and then with a particular source ofshocks removed. The
difference between the two values ofthe index is a measure ofthe im-
portance ofthe omitted source ofshocks in the business cycle process.
There are, as I am sure the authors realize, numerous problems with
such a measure when shocks are removed stepwise as in some of the
simulations-mostnotably, the results will in general not be insensitive
to the order in which the shocks are removed. In addition, the results
may be sensitive to the measure ofthe trend growth pathfor output, so
a description ofthe trend used in the simulations would be useful.
These simulations are also basedonthe assumption thatthe residuals
in the equations ofthe DRI model are not correlated with the sources
of instability. Errors in asset and commodity demand equations typi-117 The Mechanisms of the Business Cycle in the Postwar Era
cally arise for one or more of the following reasons: shocks to utility
or production functions (e.g., random elements in tastes), surprises in
the behaviorofthe policy authorities, measurement errors, and shocks
that originate externally to the United States. Measurement errors may
well be uncorrelated with the other sources of shocks. On the other
hand, the remaining shocks may be correlated owing, for example, to
various types ofautomatic stabilizers built into the economic system.
Moreover, the errors that appear in the demand equations that con-
stitute the DRI model are themselves complicated functions of all of
these "primitive" shocks. Thus, not only \\,ill the residual typically be
correlated with exogenous shocks, but the signs of these correlations
seem difficult to predict a priori. Consequently, I am less sure than
Eckstein and Sinai that theirpresupposition leads to an understatement
ofthe effects ofremoving sources ofinstability. For the same reasons,
I find it difficult to interpret the results from the first simulation in
which the errors in the equations were set to zero, while the shocks
to the exogenous variables and the policy variables remained unchanged.
Consider first the simulation of a stable lnonetary growth. A stable
monetary environment was taken to be one in which deposit ceilings
were removed, extreme changes in reserve requirements were re-
moved, and open market operations were eased when policy was tight
and tightened when policy was easy. As a result, the cyclicality index
decreased by 22.2%. The reason given for removing such restrictions
as interest rate ceilings and selective credit controls was that simply
imposing a smooth growth path for nonborrowed reserves would still
leave a highly unstable financial system. But this seems to be one of
the key issues that would be interesting to address with the DRI model.
That is, by how much does the cyclicality of GNP decrease in the
presence ofa stable monetary growth path and in the presence oflegal
restrictions on financial contracts? Although the results from such a
simulation would have to be interpreted with caution for the reasons
outlined above, they would provide some information about the se-
verity of credit crunches that arise owing to nonmonetary shocks.
Turning to the analysis of oil price shocks, the structure of this
simulation presumes (no doubt correctly) that there was a strong re-
sponse by the monetary authorities to be oil price increases. Thus the
simulation amounts to the analysis ofthe combined effects ofremoving
the oil price increase and holding the path of monetary policy un-
changed. Interestingly, the results from this analysis were very similar
to those from the simulation in which both the oil price shocks were
removed and a stable monetary path (as broadly defined above) was
imposed. As Eckstein and Sinai note, this result may be a consequence
ofa less than complete adjustment ofthe assumed monetary policy to
the different oil price assumptions. Put somewhat differently, since the118 Otto Eckstein/Allen Sinai
monetary authorities respond to exogenous shocks, to analyze the con-
sequences ofeliminating a shock it is necessary to alter the structure
ofthe time series on all ofthe policy variables. Accurate adjustments
to the policy variables is in general feasible only when the decision
rules of the private agents and policy rules of the governments are
solved for simultaneously from the model.
The final simulations reported were designed to examine the effects
on postwar business cycles of the flow offunds cycle. Here again no
attempt was made to assess the importance ofcertain "structural" re-
strictions in financial markets on the cyclical behavior ofoutput. First,
the stable money policy considered previously was imposed. Then ad-
ditional limitations were placed on the endogenous responses of con-
sumers and firms to economic developments. Specifically, in a way not
described in the paper, limited fluctuation in loan demand and disinter-
mediation was allowed. Limiting the behavior ofendogenous variables
in this manner provides little information about the role ofthe financial
sectorin economic activity. Experiments designed to determine the im-
portance ofdifferent features ofthe financial sector should involve di-
rect changes in the assumed structure ofthe financial sector.
In sum, it seems indisputable that a better understanding of how
financial arrangements affect economic decisions is critical for a better
understanding of business cycles. As in-depth analysis of the impli-
cations for economic activity ofdifferent contractural arrangements in
financial markets will probably require simulating a closed model spec-
ified at the level ofindividual agents objective functions, with the lim-
itations on financing introduced explicitly into the budget constraints.
The analysis in section 1.5 of this paper could have provided some
information about which limitations on financing are likely to be most
important quantitatively. Overall, however, Eckstein and Sinai did not
provide enough detail about the structure ofthe DRI model or conduct
sufficiently focused experiments with the model for the potential gains
from their analysis to be realized.
DiscussionSummary Stephen R. King andJohn M. Veitch
Robert Hall drew attention to the fact that table 1.6 implied that almost
no economic variation was attributable to residuals in equations, im-
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plying that the DRI model had been constructed with special factors
to dummy out otherwise inexplicable variation in time series. The anal-
ysis ofthe table showed that exogenous shifts to demand for consumer
durables were responsible for most cyclical variation. Robert Gordon
also drew attention to the overlap between this paper and those by
Hall andbyGordon andVeitch. All had notedthe increasedimportance
ofshocks toconsumerdemandfor durablegoods in the postwarperiod,
whereas before the war much ofthe variation had been in demand for
nonresidential structures.
Benjamin Friedman noted that the paperdrew an unusual distinction
between accommodative and nonaccommodative monetary policies,
the former being used to signify a constant nonborrowed reserve ag-
gregate and the latter signifying constant MI. He noted that a more
natural use of the term would have led "accommodative" to mean
keeping an interest rate constant, while "nonaccommodative" would
imply keeping a monetary aggregate fixed. Stanley Black felt that the
paper's finding that cycles were due to fluctuations in autonomous
spending was reminiscent of Adelman and .Adelman's findings (1959).
He consequently felt that the benefits ofa large model compared with
a small one were yet to be demonstrated.
Allen Sinai defended the use ofspecial variables to capture variation
in equations that other variables could not account for. He stressed
that they were not included in the equations arbitrarily but were meant
tocapture specialevents suchasautomobile strikes whoseeffects could
not be expected to be captured by equations estimated for the entire
sample period. Merely treating such events as residuals would not
identify why the schedule shifted. He also defended the use of large
models over small ones, emphasizing that which one is appropriate
depends on the purposes for which they are required.
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